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Article 4

WHAT ROLE REMAINS FOR DE FACTO PARENTHOOD?
GREGG STRAUSS
ABSTRACT

Imagineyou andyour two-year old child move in with your parents, andyou rely on them
to care for her while you work several jobs at odd hours. After several years, you get into a
fight about parenting, move out, and limit their time with your child. Should the law treat
them as equal legal parents and allow a judge to decide how much grandparentvisitation
will benefit your child? Legal doctrines with this effect now appear in the Uniform Parentage
Act (2017), the Uniform Nonparent Custody and VisitationAct, and the Restatement of Children and the Law. Under these de facto parenthoodprovisions, a nonparent can become a
legal parent if the existing parent allows her to reside with, care for, and develop a relationship parental in nature.
De facto parenthood is either unnecessary, unwise, or unconstitutional. Many courts
adopted it to protect same-sex parents from discriminatoryparentage statutes, but the new
parentagepresumptions and assisted reproductionprovisions apply irrespective of gender or
sexual orientation. De facto parenthood is often duplicative of rules about abandonment,
guardianship,de facto custody, and stepparentadoption, except its broadparentagestandard
sometimes undermines their well-established formal limits. The doctrine's only distinctive
contribution concerns former co-residentialcaregivers. It empowers judges to decide whether
it is best for a child to maintainongoing relationshipswith a relative, cohabitant, or stepparent who helped care for the child alongside her parent. In these cases, de facto parenthood
violates parents'constitutional rights. These parents consented to help, not to transfer their
parental rights. Little evidence suggests that limiting a child's ongoing relationships with
secondary caretakers is harmful. Although de facto parenthood was an essential bridge to
protect children and parents from discriminatoryparentage laws, the doctrine should have
no ongoing role in contemporary parentage law.
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION.............................................................

910

DE FACTO PARENTHOOD'S CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY .....

914
914
920
921
925
927

................

A. The De Facto ParenthoodDoctrine and its Variations......
............
B. Strong De FactoParenthoodInfringes the Right to Parent ..............
1. The ConstitutionalRight to Parent................................
2. State Responses to Troxel .....................................
C. The ConstitutionalProblem with De Facto Parenthood... ..............
III. WHAT ROLE REMAINS FOR DE FACTO PARENTHOOD?
..........................
A. De FactoParenthoodas a Substitute for Existing Doctrines.............
1. PreconceptionAgreements Substitute for ART or Presumptions........
2. Adding a Second Parent: Substitute for Adoption.......
...........
3. RepresentationAbout Parentage:Substitute for Estoppel ..................
4. Entrustment: Substitute for In Loco Parentisor Abandonment .........
B. De FactoParenthood'sDistinctive Cases.............................
1. Caregivingby Former Cohabitantsand Stepparents...
..............
2. ParentsLiving with Relatives who Assist with Childcare..................
IV. CAN DE FACTO PARENTHOOD BE CONSTITUTIONAL?
...........................
A. State Power to Define Parentage....................................
1. Limits on State Discretion to Define Parentage..
..................

930
931
931
938
941
945
951
951
953
954
955
955

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; J.D., University of Illinois College of Law.
For helpful comments, I am grateful to the workshop participants at the University Virginia
School of Law, the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign College of Law, the Georgetown
Law Center, the Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Workshop at Richmond School of Law, and the
Tenth Annual Family Law Scholars and Teachers Workshop.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

910

[Vol. 46:909

2. Limits on State Discretionto Add New Kinds of Parents...................
3. De Facto Parentsjust are ConstitutionalParents...................
B. Consent to a New Parent-likeRelationship
...........................
1. The nature of consent in general
........................
........
2. Consent as aperformativeact that transfersparentalrights.............
3. Consent as subjective assent waiuing a right to exclude ..............
4. Consent as subjective assent with knowledge of detrimental reliance
C. PresumingHarm from Termination of Parent-likeRelationships............
V.

CONCLUSION

..............................................................

I.

958
959
960
961
962
964
970
971
977

INTRODUCTION

Imagine you lose your job and the bank forecloses on your home so
you and your child move back in with your parents. While you work
multiple jobs at odd hours, your mother helps parent your child.' She
drops him off at school, takes him to soccer practice, and puts him to
bed. After a few years, you regain your financial footing and buy a
home of your own. If over this time your child and his grandmother
developed a "bonded and dependent relationship . . which is parental
in nature," 2 then some states now allow your mother to seek custody
or visitation as an equal legal parent.3 As in any custody dispute between parents, a judge will decide what division of custody or visitation is in your child's best interests.
De facto parent provisions with this effect now appear in the Uniform
Parentage Act of 2017 (UPA (2017)),4 the Uniform Nonparent Custody
and Visitation Act (UNCVA), 5 and the Restatement of Children and
the Law.6 Under these provisions, a nonparent becomes a de facto parent if the legal parent allows her to reside with, care for, and develop
a parent-like relationship with the child. 7 The UPA (2017) treats de
facto parents as equal legal parents with all the rights and responsibilities. 8 The UNCVA and the Restatement continue to label de facto
1. In 2011, Pew estimated 1.5 million children lived with both a parent and grandparent, and the grandparent reported being "currently responsible for most of the [child's] basic
needs." Gretchen Livingston, At Grandmother's House We Stay 1-2 (Pew Res. Ctr. 2013),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2013/09/grandparents-report
final 2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SEK-5LSC]. In 2017, it found twenty-three percent of solo
and four percent of married parents lived with grandparents. Gretchen Livingston, The
Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents 9-10 (Pew Res. Ctr. 2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/04/Unmarried-Parents-Full-Report-PDF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8XDV-WCYQ].
2.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

3.

See infra note 58.

§

609(d)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).

§ 609(d)

4.

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

5.

UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT

(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).

6.

RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW

§

§ 4 (UNIF.

LAW COMM'N 2018).

1.82 (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft

No. 2, 2019).
7. See infra Section II.A (offering a detailed analysis of different tests).
8.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§

609(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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parents as third parties, but allow courts to award them visitation or
custody as if they were equal legal parents.9
De facto parent doctrines spread widely over the last twenty years,
as courts and legislatures sought to alleviate discrimination against
gay and lesbian parents. o Most of the seminal de facto parenthood
cases have similar facts." A committed lesbian couple agrees to conceive and raise a child together, which they do for several years until
their relationship falls apart. Then the biological mother cuts off all
contact between the child and the non-biological mother, who had no
avenue to become a legal parent. Under state law, the paternity presumptions applied only to husbands or fathers, and only married couples could perform second-parent adoptions or enter preconception
agreements. 12 Seeking to avoid this injustice and the devastating harm
it would cause the child, courts used their equitable power to adopt a
functional parent test that would treat the non-biological mother as a
legal parent.1 3
There are hopeful signs that the tide has turned against discrimination in parentage law. While state law still needs substantial reform
to accommodate same-sex families, 1 4 some states have revised their
parentage laws to recognize same-sex parents, either on their own initiative 5 or under constitutional pressure from Obergefell v. Hodges.1 6
A primary goal of the UPA (2017) is to revise parentage law to eliminate gender discrimination." The UPA (2017) allows any non-biological parent, regardless of gender, to become a legal parent by satisfying

9. UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT § 4(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2018);
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82, cmts. i-k (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft

No. 2, 2019).
10. See infra notes 162-78. Some states first extended rights to functional parents for
stepparents who had acted in loco parentis. E.g., Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d
8, 12-17 (Neb. 1991) (collecting cases); Edwards v. Edwards, 777 N.W.2d 606, 608-09 (N.D.
2010). See Stephen Hellman, The Child, the Step-Parentand the State: Step-Parent Visitation and the Voice of the Child, 16 ToURO L. REV. 45, 51-56 (1999).
11. Eg., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419,435 (Wis. 1995). See infra Section IIAl1.
12. See infra notes 185-91, 214.
13. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016).
14. See generally Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260,
2316-2331 (2017) (describing continued difficulties that same-sex families face in establishing legal parentage).
15. E.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 669-71 (Cal. 2005).
16. E.g., McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 494, 498 (Ariz. 2017).
17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, prefatory note (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017); Courtney Joslin,
NurturingParenthoodThrough the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J. F. 589, 600-09 (2017) (describing changes made to avoid discrimination).
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the marital18 or residential presumptions,"9 by entering a preconception agreement to assisted reproduction 2 0 or surrogacy, 21 or by signing
a voluntary acknowledgement of parentage after the birth. 2 2 Why,
then, does the UPA (2017) need a de facto parenthood doctrine? Does
this doctrine still have a viable independent role?
In this Article, I argue de facto parenthood is either redundant or
unconstitutional. From a comprehensive survey of the case law, I identify six factual scenarios in which courts use de facto parenthood. The
first four scenarios-preconception agreements, informal adoptions,
misrepresentations about parentage, and child abandonment-overlap established rules of family law. In these cases, de facto parenthood
is at best redundant and at worst in conflict with existing law. Its functional standard gives courts ad hoc discretion to avoid time limits for
presumptions, formalities for agreements, and requirements of consent, unfitness, or abandonment for adoption. The final two scenarios-romantic partners or relatives who lived with a parent and assisted with childcare-are distinctive to de facto parenthood. When the
adult relationship falls apart and the parent tries to limit the former
caregiver's access to her child, this third party has no legal avenue for
custody or visitation except through de facto parenthood.
As applied in its distinctive niche, de facto parenthood will often
infringe upon parents' constitutional right to decide who may associate
with their children. In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court held
states must presume parents make visitation decisions in their chil-

dren's best interests. 23 States cannot order visitation with nonparents
simply because judges disagree with parents about whether visitation
will benefit the children. 24 Lower courts disagree about what third parties must prove to rebut this parental presumption: some adopt a harm

standard and others raise the burden of proof on the best interests
test. 25 Under either interpretation, the strong de facto parenthood doctrine conflicts with this parental presumption.
Nevertheless, courts and scholars have largely rebuffed constitutional objections to de facto parenthood. They rely on three arguments.
First, they argue Troxel does not apply to de facto parenthood because
under state law, the de facto parent is not a mere third party but a

18.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at § 204(a)(2).
at § 703.
at

§ 802(b).

at § 301.

23. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-70 (2000).
24. Id. at 68-69.
25. See infra Section II.B.2.
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coequal legal parent with her own constitutional rights.2 6 Second, they
argue the legal parent consented to the parent-like relationship, so she
exercised her parental authority and waived her right to exclude the
de facto parent. 27 Last, they argue states have a compelling interest in
preventing the psychological harm caused when a child loses parentlike relationships.28
The first argument is question-begging. Relabeling cannot solve the
constitutional problem. If de facto parenthood is consistent with parental rights, it is not because states have unlimited power to redefine
parentage in ipse dixit fashion. What matters is how and why states
elevate caregivers to parental status. Consent and harm arguments
can justify de facto parenthood in cases where the legal parent formed
an express parenting agreement, as in most of the seminal de facto
parent cases. The parent cannot object because she performed public
acts with the intent to confer parental rights on her partner and encouraged her child to form parental attachments that would now be
harmful to sever. Unfortunately, courts developed broad doctrinal
tests that sweep in many cases where these reasons do not apply, as
in most stepparent, cohabitant, or relative caregivers cases. Accepting
caregiving assistance is not the same as agreeing to full parental status, even if the legal parent wants to share "parental" activities. Moreover, there is remarkably little evidence that a child is likely to suffer
psychological harm if her parent ends her relationship with a former
cohabitant or relative caregiver. States may grant third party rights if
harm is proven in a specific case, but speculative and over inclusive
generalizations about harm cannot justify elevating all de facto parents to full parental status.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II describes de facto
parenthood doctrines and explains why elevating de facto parents to
legal status implicates constitutional rights. Part III classifies the typical fact patterns in which courts invoke de facto parenthood, arguing
this doctrine is redundant in most cases and necessary only when a
parent lives with a romantic partner or relative and allows this person
to care for her child. Part IV argues de facto parentage is unconstitutional as applied to former cohabitants or relative caregivers. De facto
parenthood may have been essential to protect children from discriminatory parentage laws, but with reformed parentage law, de facto
parenthood is either unnecessary or unconstitutional.

26. E.g., Joanna L. Grossman, ConstitutionalParentage,32 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 336
(2017); see infra Section III.A.
27. E.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553-54 (N.J. 2000); see infra Section II.B.
28. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82 cmt. e, Reporter's Note cmt. g. (AM.
LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019). See infra Section IV.C.
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II. DE FACTO PARENTHOOD'S CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY

The Supreme Court has recognized parents have a constitutional
right to decide who has access to their children. 2 9 Yet, the de facto
parenthood doctrine enables a third party who has fulfilled parental
roles to receive custody or visitation over the parent's objection. This
section describes the variety of de facto parenthood doctrines and their
constitutional difficulties.
A.

The De Facto ParenthoodDoctrine and its Variations

Thirty-three states allow functional parents to obtain visitation or
custody over the objection of a fit legal parent in some circumstances.3 0
I will call all such doctrines de facto parenthood for now, although similar rules go under different labels, including "psychological
parenthood," "equitable parenthood," or "in loco parentis."31 (While labels matter little, I explain in Part III why there are good reasons to
29. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
30. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West 2019);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.26A.440 (West 2019); Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1091 (Alaska 2004); Egan
v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213, 1221-22 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting de facto
parenthood but allowing visitation under in loco parentis statute); Bethany v. Jones, 378
S.W.3d 731, 737 (Ark. 2011) (recognizing in loco parentis);In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 554
(Colo. App. 2004); DiGiovanna v. St. George, 12 A.3d 900, 907-09 (Conn. 2011); Smith v.
Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931-32 (Del. 2011); A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.3d 878, 883 (Haw. 2016); A.C. v.
N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 695-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (stepparents and former domestic partners
may seek third party visitation); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 555-56 (Kan. 2013)
(recognizing express co-parenting agreements); Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 57779 (Ky. 2010); Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So. 3d 909, 920 (La. Ct. App. 2016); Conover v.
Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999);
SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 823-24 (Minn. 2007) (construing Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 257C.08 (2006)); McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015); Kulstad
v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 607-08 (Mont. 2009); Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 710, 717
(Neb. 2016) (in loco parentisconfers third-party standing); Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774,
778 (Nev. 2017) (for equitable adoption but not parentage presumptions); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748
A.2d 539, 551-52 (N.J. 2000); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth AC.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490-91
(N.Y. 2016) (preconception agreement); Bosemanv. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504 (N.C. 2010);
Edwards v. Edwards, 777 N.W.2d 606, 608-09 (N.D. 2010) (visitation or physical custody but
not decision-making authority); In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ohio 2011) (by agreement
to share custody, inferred from conduct); Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 221 (Okla. 2015)
(preconception agreement for same-sex committed couple unable to marry); T.B. v. L.R.M.,
786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001) (in loco parentis doctrine); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959,
961 (R.I. 2000); Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 745 (S.C. 2008) (child had no legal parent); Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); In re Parentage of L.B.,
122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995).
West Virginia is difficult to classify: "psychological parents" may not petition for custody but
they may intervene in a custody dispute, In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 148-49 (W. Va.
2005), in which case a best interests test applies, In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 27 (W. Va. 2015),
except parents still receive substantial deference even against long-term caretakers. In re
L.H., No. 17-0102, 2017 WL 5157367, at *10 (W. Va. Nov. 7, 2017) (unpublished opinion).
31. I avoid "psychological parent" because it more clearly refers to the psychological
rather than the legal relation; "equitable parent" because it implies the doctrine is inherently
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be much more precise about actual doctrinal differences.) Most states
adopted de facto parenthood when a court exercised its "equitable
power" over child custody to supplement parentage, custody, and visitation statutes. 3 2 A few jurisdictions adopted de facto parenthood statutes, including two that adopted the UPA (2017).33 Courts in thirteen
states still decline to recognize de facto parenthood.3 4 These courts often stay their hand out of deference to the legislature and the difficult
policy choices, but some recognize the potential constitutional problems.35

judicially created or involves discretionary judgments about fairness; and "in loco parentis"
because this term has a more traditional common law meaning. See infra Section III.A.4.
32. E.g., Conover, 146 A.3d at 451-52; In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 174;
H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 424-25; E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 890. The power is "equitable" in the
sense that it is exercised by chancery courts and it is judicial lawmaking but not necessarily
in the sense that it inherently involves holistic fairness judgments.
33. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (West 2009);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257C.08 (West 2018);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-211(6), 40-4-228 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West
2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 ((2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501 (West 2018);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440 (West 2019). Several courts interpret de facto custodian
statutes liberally to create de facto parenthood when a parent and child reside with a caregiver. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 554 (Colo. App. 2004) (interpreting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1410-123(1)(c)); A.A., 384 P.3d at 883 (interpreting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 571-46(a)(2)); In re H.S.,
550 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. 2018) (interpreting Tex. Fam. Code § 102.003(a)(9)). California
adopted UPA (2017) but not its de facto parent provision. 2018 Cal. Stat. 5654, 5654-55.
34. De Los Milagros Castellat v. Pereira, 225 So. 3d 368, 370-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2017); Doe v. Doe, 395 P.3d 1287, 1290 (Idaho 2017); In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 790
(Ill. 2015); Petition of Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 404-5 (Iowa 1993); Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d
15, 20 (Mich. 1999); In re Waites, 152 So. 3d 306, 314 (Miss. 2014); Nguyen v. Boynes, 396
P.3d 774, 778 (Nev. 2017) (limiting de facto parenthood to joint agreement to adopt by nonbiological parents); In re Nelson, 825 A.2d 501, 504 (N.H. 2003); In re Adoption of J.J.B., 894
P.2d 994, 1006, 1011 (N.M. 1995); Stanley J. v. Cliff L., 319 P.3d 662, 666-67 (N.M. Ct. App.
2013); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d
808, 816 (Utah 2007); Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498-99 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); LP v.
LF, 338 P.3d 908, 920 (Wyo. 2014). Georgia rejected psychological parenthood for foster parents. Drummond v. Fulton Co. Dept. of Family & Children Services, 228 S.E.2d 839, 842-43
(Ga. 1976). Missouri courts expressly reject de facto parenthood, Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d
263, 265 (Mo. 1998); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 15-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), yet recreate it
through liberal third-party custody. The statute authorizes third party custody if the "welfare of the child requires," Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375.5(5)(a) (West 2018), and while the courts
insist nonparents must prove "extraordinary circumstances" to rebut the parental presumption, this seemingly strict test can be met if the nonparent has a "significant bonded familial
custodial relationship" with the child. K.M.M. v. K.E.W., 539 S.W.3d 722, 736-38 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2017). Kansas rejected equitable parenthood, In re Hood, 847 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Kan.
1993), but this precedent was substantially weakened by Frazier, 295 P.3d at 556.
35. Compare Scarlett Z.-D, 28 N.E.3d at 790 (deferring to "legislature's superior institutional competence" to resolve conflicting policies), LP, 338 P.3d at 919-20 (concluding parentage statute lacks gaps to supplement and recognition of functional parentage required
holistic legislative solution), and Van, 597 N.W.2d at 21-22 (concluding statutory policy favoring marriage required limitation of equitable parenthood), with Nelson, 825 A.2d at 504
(explaining third party who stood in loco parentis lacked status as constitutional parent so
granting custody would violate parental rights under state constitution), and Doe, 395 P.3d
at 1291 (supplementing statutory conclusion with potential constitutional violation).
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Most states use a similar test to identify de facto parents. The most
influential test was articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, which ruled a petitioner has a "parent-like
relationship" if she proves:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered,
the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child;
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same
household;
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking
significant responsibility for the child's care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support, without
expectation of financial compensation; and
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent
relationship parental in nature. 36
Four state supreme courts and the Restatement expressly adopted
Wisconsin's test, while other states reached similar tests through their
own common law.37
A few states have broader definitions. In Hawaii and Colorado, anyone who accepts responsibility to care for a child in a shared home
can petition for custody or visitation.3 8 A few states have narrower
tests. Massachusetts only recognizes a de facto parent if he performs
an equal share of "caretaking functions," as distinguished from parental roles like financial support.3 9 Several states rejected broad de facto
parent tests initially but later limited those precedents to recognize
narrow classes of intentional parents. The high courts of Kansas, Nevada, New York, and Vermont refused broad tests but recently changed
course to recognize de facto parents who either planned the child's conception with the birth parent40 or planned the child's adoption with the
36. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995).

37. Conover, 146 A.3d at 453; V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000); Marquez v.
Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 744 (S.C. 2008); LB., 122 P.3d at 176; RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN
AND THE LAW § 1.82, cmt. a (Am. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019). West Virginia is an
example of the latter. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 156-57 (W. Va. 2005).
38. In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 818, 820 (Colo. 2012) (interpreting "physical care"); A.A v. B.B.,
384 P.3d 878, 883 (Haw. 2016) (interpreting "de facto custody" under HRS § 571-46(a)(2)).
39. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
40. In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488(N.Y. 2016) (overrulingIn re
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991)); Frazier v, Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 557 (Kan. 2013)
(also requiring express contract) (limiting In re Hood, 847 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Kan. 1993)); see
also Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217, 218, 221 (Okla. 2015) (extending recognition to intentional parents in same-sex relationships prior to same-sex marriage who engaged in intentional family planning) (overrulingDubose v. North, 332 P.3d 311 (2014)). The Vermont legislature has since adopted the broad de facto parentage provision of UPA (2017). V.S.A. 15C,
§ 501 (West 2018).
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adoptive parent. 41 Some states will not recognize de facto parents as
such, but a legal parent may agree to share custody, and this parenting
agreement may be inferred from conduct. 4 2
The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act modifies Wisconsin's definition.
Under UPA (2017) § 609, an individual is a "de facto parent" if she
"demonstrates by clear-and-convincing evidence that:
(1) the individual resided with the child as a regular member of the
child's household for a significant period;
(2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(3) the individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of
a parent of the child without expectation of financial compensation;
(4) the individual held out the child as the individual's child;
(5) the individual established a bonded and dependent relationship
with the child which is parental in nature; [and]
(6) another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and
dependent relationship required under paragraph (5). . . .43
This provision makes four changes relevant to the analysis below.
First, the de facto parent must hold the child out as her own child. No
state had previously made holding out an element. It tracks the residential presumption for infants, under which someone who "resided"
with and "openly held out" an infant as her own for the first two years
of its life is presumed to be a parent.4 4 Insofar as the UPA clearly expects
relatives will claim de facto parent status, it is difficult to predict what
this element will mean. Second, a de facto parent must have undertaken
"full and permanent responsibilities of a parent." 45 This phrase appeared in the 2001 A.L.I. Principlesof Family Dissolution and was incorporated into some common law and statutes. 4 6 Third, the UPA
(2017) privileges "consistent caretaking" by making it an independent

41. Sinnott v. Peck, 180 A3d 560, 568 (Vt. 2017) (overruling Moreau v. Sylvester, 95
A.3d 416, 421-22 (Vt. 2014); Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774, 778 (Nev. 2017) (overruling
Russo v. Gardner, 956 P.2d 98, 101-02 (Nev. 1998)).
42. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ohio 2011); Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d
569, 577 (Ky. 2010).
43. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d) (UNIF. LAW COMMN 2017).
44. Id. at § 204(a)(2).
45. Id. at § 609(d)(3).
46. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (2002) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRINCIPLES]; C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,
845 A.2d 1146, 1152, n. 13 (Me. 2004) (citing A.L.I. PRINCIPLES); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01
(West 2009). The A.L.I. Principles treats de facto parents as third parties entitled to visitation, reserving full parentage for "parent[s] by estoppel," A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, § 2.03.
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element, rather than one "obligation of parenthood" alongside education and financial support. 47 It appears to reflect a judgment that children are most likely to develop deep relationships with physical caretakers. Fourth, the UPA (2017) downplays the role of consent by the
legal parent. It removes an explicit requirement of "consent", applying
its rule whenever "another parent fostered or supported" the relationship. 48
Despite convergence on the definition, being a de facto parent can
have vastly different legal effects depending on one's jurisdiction.
Some states give the facto parent standing to seek visitation or custody
as a third party, while others treat de facto parents as coequal legal
parents entitled to visitation or custody. 4 9
When a de facto parent has third-party standing to petition for visitation or custody, she must still overcome the parent's rights by satisfying heightened substantive or procedural standards. In some cases,
she must prove denying visitation will cause "harm" to or be "detrimental" to the child. 0 In others, she must prove visitation is in the
child's best interests under a heightened burden of proof." While de

47. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N (2017) with
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-36 (factor 3).
48. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N (2017) with
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 435-36 (factor 1).
49. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthoodto
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEO.
L.J. 459, 471-72 (1990).
50. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 25-5-29(4) (2018); In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Cal.
1993); Ed H. v. Ashley C., 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 911, 924-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); DiGiovanna v.
St. George, 12 A3d 900, 907 (Conn. 2011); Ferrandv. Ferrand, 16-7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/31/16);
221 So. 3d 909, 938; Davis v. McGuire, 2018 ME 72, ¶ 15, 186 A.3d 837, 842 n.7 (noting
precedent requires harm or exceptional circumstances while statute uses best interests);
McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015); McAllister v. McAllister, 2010
ND 40, ¶ 21, 779 N.W.2d 652, 660; In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. 2000). The
Nebraska Supreme Court wrote the parental "preference is negated by a demonstration that
the best interests of the child lie elsewhere," Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Neb.
2016), but its examples look like cases of harm. See In re Guardianship of K.R. v. Mark R.,
26 Neb. App. 713, 724 (Neb. Ct. App. 2018). Some states achieve a similar affect even though
they reject de facto parenthood, such as by giving third-party standing to a "family member."
Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 499 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
51. Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1089 (Alaska 2004); Egan v. Fridlund-Horne,
211 P.3d 1213, 1224 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); In re Reese, 227 P.3d 900, 903 (Colo. App. 2010);
A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013); SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815,
822-24 (Minn. 2007); Kulstadv. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 606 (Mont. 2009) (citing MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-228 (West 2009)); Hillerv. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 890 (Pa. 2006); AJ.B.v. A.G.B.,
180 A.3d 1263, 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018); Lester v. Sanchez, No. 2015-000027, 2017 WL
4817527, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2017) (applying Moore v. Moore, 386 S.E.2d 456, 458
(S.C. 1989) (temporary entrustment case); In re Marriage of Meister, 876 N.W.2d 746, 759
(Wis. 2016). Indiana recognized de facto parents in unmarried couples have standing to seek
custody but did not address the standard, and the lower courts declined to resolve the uncertainty. A.C. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 693 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The Restatement adopts a
clear and convincing evidence standard for the test but then custody is allocated under an
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facto parents are "third parties," they are not "legal strangers."5 2 Any
nonparent with standing to petition for visitation is a third party.
Third-party standing rules identify classes of people with some legitimate expectation of an ongoing relationship.53 Other relationships fail
to confer standing entirely, including siblings,5 4 aunts, 5 5 babysitters, 6
neighbors,5 7 teachers, friends, and true strangers.
In a second group of states, de facto parenthood has a more dramatic legal effect: a de facto parent becomes a legal parent on par with
a parent by biology or adoption. 8 The judge will decide what amount
of custody or visitation is in the child's best interest, without special
presumptions in favor of either parent. 9 Some cases conclude that the
law will enforce the legal parent's agreement to share custody as long
as it serves the child's best interest.6 0 Other courts take this equivalency to its logical conclusion. Because the de facto parent is a legal
parent, she has her own constitutional right to visitation that cannot
be denied without compelling reasons. 6 1 Consequently, the burden
shifts to the legal parent. A de facto parent should "almost invariably"
receive visitation, unless a legal parent proves she is unfit or "visitation will cause physical or emotional harm to the children." 6 2
The UPA adopts this last, strongest form of de facto parenthood.
Once the petitioner proves she is a de facto parent and having another

ordinary best interest analysis. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82(a), (d) (Am.
LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
52. Some scholars criticize states that recognize functional parents but still apply a parental presumption as if the stepparent were a "legal stranger." E.g., Polikoff, supra note 49,
at 511-13.
53. Jackson v. Garland, 622 A.2d 969, 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
54. Weber v. Weber, 524 A2d 498 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
55. Romasz v. Coombs, 55 N.Y.S.3d 770, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
56. In re D.T., 292 P.3d 1120, 1122 (Colo. App. 2012).
57. P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780, 789 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding petitionerneighbor became a de facto parent when her relationship "developed from that of an occasional babysitter to the primary residential parent, viewed by [aunt who had legal custody]
as an equal in raising [the child]").
58. VT. STAT. ANN. § 15C-501 (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440 (West
2019); Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931-32 (Del. 2011); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542,
558 (Kan. 2013); Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d
539, 554 (N.J. 2000); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 501 (N.Y. 2016);
Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1256 (R.I. 2009); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161,
177 (Wash. 2005).
59. Conover, 146 A.3d at 453; Resendes, 966 A.2d at 1256.
60. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (agreement to share
caretaking is acting contrary to the constitutionally protected status); In re Mullen, 953
N.E.2d 302, 308 (Ohio 2011). Still others use a best interests test for third party visitation
under in loco parentisor de facto custodian statutes. Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731, 738
(Ark. 2011); A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.3d 878, 883 (Haw. 2016).
61. Polikoff, supra note 49, at 521.
62. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554-55 (N.J. 2000).
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parent is in the best interests of the child, "the court shall adjudicate
the individual who claims to be a de facto parent to be a parent of the
child." 63 Adjudication as a de facto parent is an equal path to establish
the "parent-child relationship," on par with parentage by birth, biology,
presumptions, and preconception agreements. 6 4 The UNCVA labels de
facto parents as "third parties," yet it directs courts to award visitation
or custody to de facto parents if doing so is in the child's best interest. 5
This provision maintains the rhetoric of non-parent visitation but treats
de facto parents as equal parents for the purposes of visitation or custody.
Of course, many states do not fall neatly into these two archetypes.
Some states have different standards for custody and visitation. Some assume custody is more intrusive, so they award de facto parents custody
only for harm but grant visitation under a best interests test.6 6 Some
rules appear to rest on one end as a formal matter, yet fall nearer the
opposite in practice. For example, courts may say de facto parents are
third parties who may receive visitation only in "exceptional cases," yet
they assume cutting ties with a de facto parent is exceptional, which in
practice gives de facto parents a presumptive right to visitation. 67
Maine offers a twist. A de facto parent can become an equal legal parent only if she proves "by clear and convincing evidence, that harm to the
child will occur if he or she is not acknowledged to be the child's de facto
parent."6 8
B.

Strong De Facto ParenthoodInfringes the Right to Parent

De facto parenthood allows a third party to obtain visitation or custody over the objection of a fit legal parent, yet the United States Su-

63. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017) (emphasis added).
64. Id. at § 201 (listing de facto parentage as an equal way to establish a parent-child
relationship).
65. UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT § 4(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM N 2018).
66. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409(A), (C) (West 2013); Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d
1078, 1085-86, 1089 (Alaska 2004); McCrillis v. Hicks, 518 S.W.3d 734, 743 (Ark. Ct. App.
2017); R.D. v. A.H., 912 N.E.2d 958, 964 (Mass. 2009); Smith v. Wilson, 90 So. 3d 51, 57
(Miss. 2012) (third-party visitation using best interests test); In re Custody of M.A.G., 859
So. 2d 1001, 1003-04 (Miss. 2003) (third-party custody requires unfitness). Connecticut takes
the opposite approach. Fish v. Fish, 939 A.2d 1040, 1059-61 (Conn. 2008). Oregon is difficult
to classify. A psychological parent can "overcome the presumption that a legal parent acts in
the best interests of the child" "by a preponderance of the evidence" with respect to five statutory factors, while anyone with a personal relationship to the child can receive visitation if
they rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119
(West 2018); In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721, 733-34, 738-39 (Or. 2004).
67. Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 172 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); K.M.M. v. K.E.W.,
539 S.W.3d 722, 736-38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
68. Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1181 (Me. 2014) (plurality opinion).
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preme Court has repeatedly "recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children."6 9
1.

The ConstitutionalRight to Parent

In Troxel v. Granville, the Court concluded parents' rights limit the
power of states to order visitation with third parties against the wishes
of a fit parent.7 0 Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel had two daughters. When they separated, Brad moved in with his parents, where
he brought the children for his weekend visitations.7 2 Two years later,
Brad committed suicide.7 3 For the next six months, Granville arranged
for her daughters to visit Brad's parents every other weekend.7 4 When
she later tried to scale back the visits to one day a month, the grandparents filed a petition seeking visitation every other weekend.7 6
Washington's visitation statute provided that "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time, including but not limited to custody proceedings," and "[t]he court may order visitation
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the
child."" The trial judge remarked that he believed, from his experience
with his grandparents, that "in most situations a commonsensical approach [is that] it is normally in the best interest of the children to
spend quality time with the grandparent." 8 He "balanced" the children's interest in a relationship with loving grandparents and extended family against their interest in spending time with their "nuclear family," concluding their welfare would be best promoted by one
weekend of overnight visitation with their grandparents per month. 9
69. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923)); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J.
R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
70. 530 U.S. at 69-70 (plurality); id. at 79 (J. Souter, concurring in judgment); id. at 80
(J. Thomas, concurring in judgment).
71. Id. at 60.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and ParentalRights: From Meyer v.
Nebraska to Troxel v. Granuille, 8 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 101 (2006) (citing In re Visitation
of Troxel, Brief for Respondents (No. 99-138), 1999 WL 1146868, *8-*9 (U.S. 1999)).
75. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. Granville believed the frequent visits were preventing her
children from forming bonds with her new fianc6. Lawrence, supra note 74, at n. 198.
76. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
77. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 24 (Wash. 1998) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.10.160(3) (1998)).
78. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
79. Id. at 72.
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The Supreme Court of Washington held the third-party visitation
statute was facially unconstitutional because its standing and substantive rules violated parental Constitutional rights.8 0 Only if parents
have "a right to limit visitation of their children with third persons"
can they have control over fundamental decisions, such as whether
their children are exposed to physical discipline or exposed to religious,
racist, or sexist beliefs.81 Although the court acknowledged that "arbitrarily" ending a substantial non-parental relationship might cause
harm, the statute did not demand proof of relationship or of harm.8 2
Asserting that a judge has authority to award visitation to whomever
she believes will improve "a child's quality of life" is "the logical equivalent to asserting that the state has the authority to break up stable
families and redistribute its infant population to provide each child
with the 'best family.' "83 A parent has no real authority if the law respects her decision only when a judge agrees with it.8 4 The court concluded a person may petition for visitation only if she has a substantial
relationship with the child85 and may receive visitation only if necessary to avoid harm to the child.8 6
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, with six judges concluding Washington violated Granville's right to parent under substantive due process. 87 Justice O'Connor wrote for a four-judge plurality.8 8 The plurality avoided both of the broad conclusions reached in
the lower court. They described the standing rule as "breathtaking
broad" but also said "the problem" in this case was not that the Troxels
were allowed to petition for visitation.8 9 They also declined to decide
"whether the Due Process Clause requires all non-parental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm,"90 preferring instead to focus on
the "specific manner in which the standard is applied."9 1 They concluded that the statute was unconstitutional "as applied in this case "92
80. Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
81. Id. at 31.
82. Id. at 30.
83. Id. at 30-31.
84. Id. at 30 (citing Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 (Tenn. 1993)) (quoting
Kathleen Bean, GrandparentVisitation: Can the ParentRefuse?, 24 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM.
L. 393, 441 (1985-86)) ("For the state to delegate to the parents the authority to raise the
child as the parents see fit, except when the state thinks another choice would be better, is
to give the parents no authority at all.")).
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id. at 30.
87. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J., plurality); id at 77-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 60.
89. Id. at 67, 69.
90. Id. at 73.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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because the trial court "gave no special weight at all to Granville's determination of her daughters' best interests."93 To respect parental authority, states must presume a fit parent acts in their child's best interest, 9 4 which means:

[T]he decision whether such an intergenerational relationship
would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make in
the first instance. And, if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue
here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at
95
least some special weight to the parent's own determination.
The family court judge did not simply ignore this presumption; he reversed it. He assumed children benefit from grandparent relationships
and, therefore, the children should spend time with the Troxels unless
Granville proved visitation would affect her daughters "adversely."9 6
Justices Souter and Thomas wrote separate opinions concurring in
the judgment. Souter agreed with the Washington Supreme Court that
the statute was facially unconstitutional because of its unlimited
standing provision. 97 Thomas applied traditional strict scrutiny, concluding that "Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest-to say nothing of a compelling one-in second-guessing a fit parent's decision regarding visitation with third parties."98 For such a
fragmented decision, the Supreme Court directs lower courts to follow
the concurrence decided on the "narrowest grounds."99 Unfortunately,
it is unclear which Troxel opinion is narrowest. Thomas' opinion is the
broadest along several dimensions: it concludes that the statute is invalid on its face and that there are no compelling reasons for thirdparty visitation against the parent's objection. Between Souter and the
plurality, the answer is more difficult. Souter concludes the statute is
facially unconstitutional, while the plurality limits itself to an as applied conclusion; 100 yet, Souter's opinion prohibits only extraordinarily
broad standing rules, while the plurality opinion limits all nonparent
visitation cases. 101 For purposes of this essay, I assume the plurality is
controlling, recognizing that this conclusion is tentative.
The dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Kennedy merit
brief review because courts and scholars rely on them to support de
93. Id. at 69.
94. Id. at 68.
95.

Id. at 70.

96. Id. at 69.
97. Id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 80. (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
100. McGaw v. McGaw, 468 S.W.3d 435, 446 n. 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (finding the plurality narrower because it was as applied).
101. David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48
UCLAL. REV. 1125, 1190 n. 82 (2001).
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facto parenthood. 1 0 2 Justice Stevens adopts a strikingly instrumental
theory of parental rights. He mentions parental "right[s]" when describing precedent, 103 but his analysis slides easily from talk of rights
to "fundamental liberty interest[s]" to simple interest balancing. 104 He
recognizes parents have "a fundamental liberty interest in caring for
and guiding their children . . . without the undue interference of
strangers,"o yet "the parent's interests in a child must be balanced
against the State's long-recognized interests as parenspatriae . . and,
critically, the child's own complementary interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and protection."1 0 6 When parents engage in "arbitrary exercise of parental authority," the state may intervene to protect the child's "interests in preserving established familial
or family-like bonds." 107 Although Stevens says courts should respect
parents' decisions unless they are "arbitrary," he regards parental decisions as arbitrary if a judge concludes they "neither serve nor are
motivated by the best interests of the child."1 0 8 Justice Stevens treats
parental rights as a mere heuristic for child welfare. If parents exercise their authority in ways that do not serve child welfare, their decisions warrant no deference.
Justice Kennedy wrote a more measured dissent, which scholars
and courts often quote to justify reforms to recognize functional parents.1 09 He criticizes the lower court for assuming a nuclear family
model in which "the . . parents who resist visitation have always been
the child's primary caregivers and that the third parties who seek visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with the
child."110 This assumption obscures cases where a "third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period of time, has developed
a relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject to absolute
parental veto." 1' In those cases, a best-interests test may be appropriate,
especially if the law has other "methods for limiting parents' exposure to
third-party visitation petitions and for ensuring parental decisions are

102. E.g., A.A., 384 P.3d at 889; Lawrence Schlam, Standing in Third-Party Custody
Disputes in Arizona: Best Interests to ParentalRights-and Shifting the Balance Back Again,
47 ARIz. L. REV. 719, 732 (2005).
103. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86-87.
104. Id. at 87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 86.
106. Id. at 88.
107. Id. at 88-89.
108. Id. at 91.
109. E.g., Solangel Maldonado, When Father (orMother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 898 (2003);
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82, cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2019).
110. Id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
111. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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given respect." 1 12 Kennedy describes options but disclaims any intent to
opine on their constitutionality.1 1 3 He concludes only that proof of harm
is not categorically required, and the constitutionality of a best interests test "depends on more specific factors" that "must be elaborated
with care, using the discipline and instruction of the case law system." 114
2. State Responses to Troxel
Aside from ruling out a pure best-interests test, the Troxel plurality
says little about what states must do to maintain the parental presumption that ensures parental decisions receive "special weight." The
states have adopted two basic mechanisms: they either raise the substantive standard for granting third-party visitation or apply a heightened standard of proof for the best-interests test.1 1 5
Raising the merits standard is the cleanest option. Twenty states
award third-party visitation or custody over a parent's objection only
to prevent harm to the child. Sixteen high courts have held a harm
standard is necessary to protect parental rights under either the federal or a state constitution.1 1 6 The other four adopted a harm standard
by statute,1 7 often after courts invalidated their statutes instead of
112. Id. at 99.
113. Id. at 100-01.
114. Id. at 101.
115. See Weldon v. Ballow, 200 So. 3d 654, 670 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (collecting cases).
Three outliers use a simple best interests test as long as it does not substantially burden
parental liberty. The Mississippi Supreme Court directs judges to evaluate the burden using
ten factors, such as the distance to the grandparents' home and their respect for parental
child-rearing. Smith v. Wilson, 90 So. 3d 51, 57-58 (Miss. 2012). The West Virginia Supreme
Court expressed its confidence that third-party visitation orders "would not interfere with
the parent-child relationship" as long as trial courts consider the twelve statutory factors,
one of which is "the preferences of the parents." Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 68485 (W. Va. 2001). See also In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 30-31 (W. Va. 2015) (parental presumption is a slightly-tilted best interests test).
116. Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 650 (Ala. 2011); Osterkamp v. Stiles, 235 P.3d 178,
185 (Alaska 2010); Crockett v. Pastore, 789 A.2d 453, 459 (Conn. 2002); Sullivan v. Sapp,
866 So. 2d 28, 36 (Fla. 2004) (state right to privacy); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769,
773 (Ga. 1995); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067, 1080 (Haw. 2007); In re Marriage of Howard, 661
N.W.2d 183, 191 (Iowa 2003); Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 195 (Md. 2007); Blixt v.
Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2002); Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 222 (N.J. 2003);
Craig v. Craig, 253 P.3d 57, 63 (Okla. 2011); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.
1993); Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1990) (custody); In re Pensom, 126
S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. App. 2003) (visitation); Jones v. Jones, 359 P.3d 603, 612 (Utah 2015);
Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197, 205 (Vt. 2003); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417, 418
(Va. 1998); In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 109 P.3d 405, 413 (Wash. 2005); see also In re
Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 145 (Colo. 2005) (harm required to interfere with parental
autonomy). Compare UNCVA, supra note 5, at § 4 cmt. 3 (citing ten opinions and nine statutes but no opinions before Troxel), with Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the
Rights of Third Partiesto Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 5 (2013).
117. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(d), (e) (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.9(b)(3)
(West 2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 16 722.27b (4)(b) (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED
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narrowing them.118 Some states require "substantial" or "significant"
harm and emphasize that losing a meaningful non-parental relationship is not sufficient.119
The other states protect parental rights with evidentiary rules.
These rules come in two forms. The first form allows third party visitation only if the petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence that
visitation serves the best interest of the child. Fifteen state statutes
adopt a clear and convincing standard, 1 2 0 and five state high courts
have held this sufficient to respect parents' rights. 1 2 1 The second form
instructs family courts to apply a rebuttable parental presumption and
give parents' preferences "special weight." Eight state courts have upheld this type of third-party visitation statute. 12 2
Most of the states that direct trial courts to apply the parental presumption say little about how this operates in practice. 123 The petitioner
might bear the burden of production or the burden of persuasion, or she

LAWS § 25-5-29, -30 (2017). Several more states passed harm statutes after their courts held
a harm standard was constitutionally necessary. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.2(e) (2016); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-59(b) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(c)(1) (West 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 366-306(b)(1) (2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.432(c) (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a103(2)(f) (West 2017).
118. Seagrave v. Price, 79 S.W.3d 339, 346 n. 1 (Ark. 2002); Flynn v. Henkel, 880 N.E.2d
166, 169 (Ill. 2007); DeRose v. DeRose, 666 N.W.2d 636, 643 (Mich. 2003); Clough v. Nez, 759
N.W.2d 297, 302 (S.D. 2008) (describing statute as codification of the "extraordinary circumstances" listed in Meldrum v. Novotny, 640 N.W.2d 460, 470-71 (S.D. 2002) (Konenkamp, J.,
concurring in part)).
119. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59(b) (West 2013); Jones, 359 P.3d at 613; Doe,
172 P.3d at 1077.
120. UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT § 5 cmt. at 16-17 (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 2018) (listing twenty-two states with a clear and convincing evidence standard, but
seven of these states also use a harm or detriment substantive standard).
121. In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 327 (Colo. 2006); In re Guardianship of B.H.,
770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002); Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 873 (Ky. 2012); Hunter v.
Hunter, 771 N.W.2d 694, 705 (Mich. 2009); Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d 519, 523 (Mont.
2006); Camburn v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565, 568 (S.C. 2003) (listing harm as the example of
clear and convincing evidence).
122. In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 418 P.3d 884, 890 (Ariz. 2018); Deem v. Lobato,
96 P.3d 1186, 1192 (N.M. 2004) (enough if courts "accord deference to the parents[] wishes");
In re S.B., 845 N.W.2d 317, 323 (N.D. 2014); Harroldv. Collier, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ohio
2005); In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721, 733 (Or. 2004); Hiller v. Fausey,
904 A.2d 875, 890 (Pa. 2006); In re Paternity of Roger D.H., 641 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Ct. App.
Wis. 2002). Louisiana's statute grants visitation under a best interest test that lists the parental presumption as one factor, LA. CIV.CODE ANN. art 136(D)(1) (West 2018), but thirdparty custody requires proof of harm. LA. CIV.CODE ANN. art 133 (West 2018). California law
is uncertain. Compare Ian J. v. Peter M., 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2013),
with Fenn v. Sherriff, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1466, 1470-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2003).
123. The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to decide the standard to rebut the parental
presumption, In re Marriage of Meister, 876 N.W.2d 746, 759 (Wis. 2016), but the court of
appeals quickly certified this question and the court granted cert. Michels v. Lyons, 918
N.W.2d 75 (2018). The Oregon statute offers an admirable contrast. In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721, 740 (Or. 2004) (interpreting OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (2018) (describing five "factors" courts must consider to decide whether the presumption is rebutted)).
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might implicitly raise the burden of persuasion. A mere burden-shift
is unlikely to satisfy Troxel. A third-party petitioner ordinarily bears
the burden of production. Even ensuring petitioners also have the burden of persuasion does not give "special weight" to parental judgments.
The judge will decide for herself whether the child benefits from visitation, only giving independent weight to the parent's judgment if the
evidence is in equipoise. Perhaps that is all the deference parental
judgments merit, but then we should openly say there is no fundamental right to parent. If Troxel means only that a parent's beliefs are the
tiebreaker when a judge concludes the evidence is in equipoise, then
parental liberty is hardly "fundamental." The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, which has the most extensive judicial discussion of the rebuttable presumption, implicitly raises the standard of persuasion. It says
the substantive question is what serves the child's interests, but courts
should grant visitation only for "convincing reasons," because the "evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the parents' side." 1 2 4
A third option, perpendicular to the previous two, is to restrict the
class of people with statutory standing. Only two concurring justices
concluded the standing provisions in the Washington statute were unconstitutional. Nevertheless, nearly all the states that use a best interests test limit standing, typically to grandparents, close blood relatives, or nonparents who have had physical custody of the child. 1 25
Other states limit grandparent visitation to specific circumstances,
such as when a parent is deceased or had her rights terminated or
when the parents are divorcing or living separately. 1 2 6 A few statutes
allow petitions for visitation only if the parent cuts off all visitation, in
order to defer to parental decisions about the extent of visitation. 1 27
C.

The ConstitutionalProblem with De Facto Parenthood

Weak de facto parenthood doctrines do not run afoul of Troxel; in
fact, they are a direct application of the plurality opinion. Recall that
under weak versions of de facto parenthood, the psychological parent
has standing to petition for visitation or custody as a third party under
heightened substantive or evidentiary standards.
The easiest way to reconcile de facto parenthood with parental
rights is to demand de facto parents prove denying visitation risks
harm, as many states do. 12 8 Other states grant visitation or custody to

124. Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 887 (Pa. 2006).
125. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5
(West 2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (West 2015).
126. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 2010).
127. E.g., Loviace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tenn. 2013) (interpreting TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-6-306(a) (West 2018)); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (2018).
128. See supra note 50.
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de facto parents only if refusing it "clearly would be detrimental to the
child." 12 9 Even if parental rights trigger strict scrutiny, preventing
harm to a particular child should be a compelling state interest.
Of course, this concept of harm is vague. To specify it, states must
chart a course between two unacceptable options. On one side, losing
a parent-like relationship cannot itself be a sufficient harm. Some
courts assume that "inherent in the bond between child and psychological parent is the risk of emotional harm to the child should the
relationship be curtailed." 13 0 This collapses the harm and best interest
tests, and it implies that anyone who qualifies as a de facto parent
meets the substantive test for visitation.1 3 1 States need a baseline capable of distinguishing being harmed from merely losing a benefit. 13 2
On the other hand, the requisite harm must be less than the harm
required to prove parental unfitness. Some courts demand de facto
parents prove neglect or abandonment.1 3 3 With such a demanding test,
de facto parenthood applies only in termination cases, where the parent cannot object to non-parental custody anyway.
A plurality of the Maine Supreme Court has articulated one plausible intermediate standard: "the child's life would be substantially
and negatively affected if the person who has undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in that
child's life is removed from that role." 13 4 This standard is well-illustrated by In re Marriageof Allen, a well-known stepparent case.1 35 The
court awarded custody of a child to his stepmother rather than her
129. Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 154 (Alaska 2002).
130. Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162,169 (S. C. Ct. App. 2006); see also A.H. v.
M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1070 (Mass. 2006); Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d 297, 304-05 (S.D.
2008) (finding proof "provision of the child's physical, emotional, and other needs by persons
other than the parent over a significant period of time" is sufficient to infer "significant emotional harm" without expert testimony).
131. Gordius v. Kelley, 139 A.3d 928, 931-32 (Me. 2016) (reversing trial court that had
assumed "exceptional circumstances" exist whenever a child loses a parent-like relationship
because "these ruptured relationships can be deeply wounding").
132. If one assumes any diminution in wellbeing is a harm, then this distinction is nonsensical. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 97-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). A similar difficulty
arises for attempts to define harm for purpose of abuse and neglect. DAVID ARCHARD, Can
Child Abuse be Defined, in MORAL AGENDAS FOR CHILDREN'S WELFARE 65-66 (Michael King,
ed.,1999) (noting possible baselines for abuse as the minimum universal needs for survival,
the minimum acceptability with a community's norms, or the best possible upbringing).
133. Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 710, 717 (Neb. 2016) (permitting non-parental custody for adult standing in loco parentis only if parent neglected child or forfeited parental
rights by abandonment).
134. Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1181 (plurality opinion). Maine adopted a new de facto
parent statute that does not require harm, ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (2016), but the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether harm is constitutionally required. Davis v.
McGuire, 186 A.3d 837, 842 n. 7 (Me. 2018).
135. 626 P.2d 16, 23 (Me. 1981) (described in Polikoff, supranote 49, at 509- 10); Cynthia

G. Bowman, The Legal Relationship Between Cohabitantsand Their Partners'Children, 13
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 127, 138 (2012)).
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former husband, the legal father. 13 6 They had married when his son
was three.1 37 The child was deaf, and had substantially delayed development. 13 8 The stepmother took charge of his care: she enrolled him in
sign language programs and took on substantial debt to provide special tools and training. 13 9 She and her three children all became fluent
in sign language. 14 0 In contrast to her "exceptional ... dedication," the
father's attitude was "apathetic and fatalistic" and his sign language
skills were "minimal." 14 1 Due to the stepmother's efforts and the child's
integration into her family, he caught up with his peers by the time he
was seven. 142 The appellate court concluded the child's welfare "outweigh[ed]" the father's parental rights, for two reasons. 143 Although
the father was a fit and caring parent, awarding him custody would
"set back [the child's] intellectual development" by limiting his "opportunities for interaction and communication." 144 Second, the child, his
stepmother and stepsiblings had become a "family unit" over eight
years, and disrupting their "everyday living relationship . .

would

have deeply disturbed" the child. 145
Instead of a harm standard, some states demand de facto parents
prove visitation will serve the best interests of the child under a
heightened standard of persuasion. 1 4 6 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court applies its third-party framework to de facto parents. A court
may award visitation to a person acting in loco parentis (effectively a
de facto parent) if it is in the best interests of the child, but the petitioner
must offer convincing reasons to offset the scale "tipped hard" to the parent. 14 7
A heightened standard of persuasion is sufficient in theory, but it
faces difficulties in application. As the Troxel plurality emphasized,
the wording of the legal test matters less than how courts apply it. 14 8
De facto parents must not receive visitation as a matter of course,
136. Allen, 626 P.2d at 18-19.
137. Id. at 18.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 18-19.
143. Id. at 22.
144. Id. at 22.
145. Id. at 23.
146. In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002) ("clearly and convincingly overcome by
evidence proving that the child' s best interests are substantially and significantly served");
Hunter v. Hunter, 771 N.W.2d 694, 706 (Mich. 2009); In re C.T.C., 339 P.3d 54, 58 (Mont.
2014).
147. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 919 n. 8 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Charles v. Stehlik, 744
A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa. 2000)).
148. Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
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simply because judges or legislators believe children benefit from de
facto parent relationships. Similar reasoning led the trial court in
Troxel to reverse the parental presumption. 1 4 9 If judges assume maintaining parent-like relationships generally benefits children, then they
may effectively demand parents disprove those benefits. The temptation to second-guess legal parents will be stronger in de facto parent
cases than grandparent cases. Once a court concludes the petitioner
and child have a parent-like relationship, it is easy to slip into thinking
the de facto parent ought to receive visitation and custody, instead of
assuming the legal parent's decisions about whether to sustain that
relationship is presumptively correct.
Eight states, the UPA (2017), and the Restatement embrace that
result.5 0 They adopt strong facto parenthood tests that allow a judge
to decide whether visitation or custody with a de facto parent serves
the child's best interests, without giving special weight to the legal
parent's judgment. How can this be reconciled with Troxel? Courts and
scholars make three kinds of arguments, each of which I discuss in
detail in Part IV below. First, they argue Troxel does not apply, because de facto parents are not third parties but full legal parents. Second, they argue de facto parenthood does not impinge on the rights of
a legal parent because she consented to this parental relationship. Finally, they argue states have compelling reasons to limit parental
rights because losing parent-like relationships harms children. To
evaluate these arguments, we need a closer look at the type of cases in
which courts apply de facto parenthood. Whether de facto parent decisions violate parental rights depends on the how the test is applied.
III. WHAT ROLE REMAINS FOR DE FACTO PARENTHOOD?
This section offers a typology of the fact patterns in which courts
invoke de facto parenthood. In the first four, the doctrine overlaps formal parentage rules for agreements, adoption, misrepresentation, and
abandonment.' The doctrine is often simply redundant in these cases,
but sometimes its new standard blunts the formal limits of traditional
rules. In two kinds of cases, when a stepparents or relatives lives with
the parent and performs substantial childcare, the de facto parent doctrine is the only way a petitioner can obtain a right to custody or visitation. This is de facto parenthood's distinctive conceptual niche.
149. Id. at 69.
150. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017); supra note 58;
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82, cmts. i-k (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft

No. 2, 2019).
151. The UPA (2017) and other scholars lump together different doctrines that protect
functional parents. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. at 50 (UNIF. LAW COMM N 2017); Leslie
Joan Harris, Obergefell's Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55,
61 (2017). Others, particularly Nancy Polikoff, carefully distinguish de facto parenthood

2019] WHAT ROLE REMAINS FOR DE FACTO PARENTHOOD?

A.

931

De Facto Parenthoodas a Substitute for Existing Doctrines

1. PreconceptionAgreements Substitute for ART or Presumptions
A and B agree that A will conceive a child by assisted reproductive
technology and they will raise the child together. B assists with A's
pregnancy. After the birth, B lives with the child andperforms caretaking responsibilitiesfor several years. A and B represents to the child
and the public that B is the child's parent, and the child regards both
A and B as parents.
Most of the seminal cases adopting de facto parenthood involve
strikingly similar facts: two women in a committed relationship enter
a preconception agreement and then raise the child together as equal
parents for years. 15 2 An early and well-known case, In re H.S.H.-K, is
a prototype.1 5 3 Two women, Knott and Holtzman, purchased a home
together and held a commitment ceremony. 154 They decided to have a
child together by having Knott use artificial insemination, and four
years later, she became pregnant.' Holtzman assisted with obstetrical appointments, birth classes, and the birth. 1 6 They chose his name
together, giving him a surname that combined their last names.1 57
During his church dedication ceremony, Knott and Holtzman were
both announced as his parents.1 8 For the next four years, Holtzman
provided financial support and shared everyday childcare.1 9 "The two
women explained to the child that there are many kinds of families
and that he had two parents who loved him very much."160 When their
son was five, Knott ended her relationship with Holtzman, moved out
with their son, and refused to allow Holtzman any visitation.16 1
from other doctrines. See Polikoff, supra note 49, at 491-525. Polikoff argued courts were
straining exceptions to parental authority to protect non-biological mothers in lesbian relationships; instead, they should create a functional parent rule to recognize these mothers as
full parents. Id. at 483. In contrast, I argue in this article that once formal parentage rules
recognize same-sex parents on a nondiscriminatory basis, we do not need a functional parentage rule that conflict with existing rules to allocate parental authority.
152. See infra notes 168, 180-90. But see Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W.3d 140,
143 (Ark. 2005) (expanding in loco parentis to permit post-divorce visitation for stepparent
in different-sex couple); In re Marriage of Dureno, 854 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Colo. App. 1992)
(allowing stepparent to seek custody under statute permitting anyone who cared for child
for six months to seek visitation); AC. v. N.J., 1 N.E.3d 685, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (extending established stepparent visitation to same-sex couple with domestic partnership).
153. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435 (Wis. 1995).
154. Id. at 421.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 421-22.
157. Id. at 422.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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Many of the cases adopting de facto parenthood for the first time
in
Hawaii 162
cases
facts,
including
involve
similar
Massachusetts, 166
Maryland, 16 1
Kentucky, 16 3Maine, 164
New Hampshire, 1 67 New Jersey, 168 New York,1 6 9 North Carolina,1 7 0
Oklahoma,1 7 1 Rhode Island, 17 2 Washington,1 7 3 and West Virginia. 17 4 If
these had been heterosexual rather than same-sex couples, then the
legal paternity of the non-biological parent would be easy to establish
under common parentage rules, as I discuss at length below.1 7 5 Statutory parentage law discriminated on the basis of gender and marital
status, and courts were unwilling to interpret the statutes in ways that
would extend them to same-sex parents. Instead, courts reached for
the retroactive and functional de facto parenthood to rectify the legislature's lack of sympathy for same-sex parents. 17 6
162. A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.3d 878, 880 (Haw. 2016). A.A concluded a statute providing
"[a]ny person who has had de facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home,"
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(a)(2) (2016), applied to nonparents who lived at all times with the
legal parent. See A.A., 384 P.3d 878, 880, 891-92 (Haw. 2016). The only prior case cited was
Inoue v. Inoue, 185 P.3d 834, 842 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008), in which mother was equitably estopped to deny a father's marital presumption.
163. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky. 2010). Mullins recognizes, as the
lower court of appeals held, its prior waiver cases involved a parent surrendering physical
custody, but then decides to extend that principle to recognize partial waiver through intent
to co-parent with joint custody. Id.
164. C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1147 (Me. 2004). C.E. W. cites two Maine cases
recognizing functional parents: one equitable estoppel case in which a marital father raised
a child he believed was his genetic child for three years, Stitham v. Henderson, 768 A.2d 598
(Me. 2001), and one abandonment case in which the father left his child with its grandmother
for four years, Merchant v. Bussell, 27 A.2d 816, 817-19 (Me. 1942). C.E.W, 845 A.2d at
1149-51.
165. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 435 (Md. 2016) (overruling Janice M. v. Margaret
K., 948 A.2d 73, 86 (Md. 2008)). Conover cites a Maryland case recognizing a functional parent, id. at 447, but it is an estoppel case in which a man relied on his partner's assertion that
he was the genetic father, they subsequently married, and their divorce included a joint custody agreement, Monroe v. Monroe, 621 A.2d 898, 899 (Md. 1993).
166. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-93 (Mass. 1999). E.N.O. cites two relevant
precedents. Id. (citing Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Mass. 1999) (awarding visitation to an aunt because the father allowed her to raise his daughter for eleven years during military deployments); C.C. v. AB., 550 N.E.2d 365, 372-73 (Mass. 1990) (allowing a
biological father to rebut the marital presumption because he lived with the mother at the
time of conception and the child after its birth, developing a "substantial relationship.")).
167. In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98A.3d 494, 496 (N.H. 2014).
168. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000). VC. recounts numerous cases awarding custody to "psychological parents" but admits-as if this were a minor point-that, "[t]o
be sure, prior cases in New Jersey have arisen in the context of a third party taking over the
role of an unwilling, absent or incapacitated parent." Id. at 550.
169. In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490-91 (N.Y. 2016). Before
Brooke S.B., New York used equitable estoppel only to hold presumed fathers liable for child
support, id. at 496, and had twice declined to adopt parenthood by estoppel or de facto parentage for preconception agreement cases, Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28-29
(N.Y. 1991); Debra H. v. Janice R, 930 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 2010).
170. Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504 (N.C. 2010). Boseman cited a rule that a
parent can lose their parental presumption if they engage in conduct "inconsistent with the
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The courts did not, of course, draw de facto parenthood out of thin
air. Each court could cite a handful of cases awarding visitation to persons who were not biological or adoptive parents. In most of the precedents, either legal parents abandoned the child, or the mother lied to
her husband about his paternity for years.177 A few ordered visitation
with a stepparent who fulfilled parental roles during the marriage, but
only after finding parental custody would be harmful. 17 8 These precedents did protect functional parents, but they rested on distinguishable principles of abandonment or estoppel. I discuss those legal principles below. In this section, the crucial point is that courts do not need
to stretch to protect non-biological mothers if parentage law does not
discriminate on the basis of sex and gender.

protected status of natural parents," id. at 503 (quoting Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528,
534-35 (N.C. 1997)), but that rule was adopted in a paternity estoppel case, in which the
mother left the child with the putative father and in which the court merely reversed to
determine if she intended it to be permanent or temporary, Price, 484 S.E.2d at 536-37.
Boseman was preceded by Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 68 (N.C. App. 2008), a samesex intentional parenting case that relied on Price and another lower court case granting
stepparent custody when the legal parent left the child with the stepparent for substantial
time, Ellison v. Ramos, 502 S.E.2d 891, 895 (N.C. App. 1998).
171. Eldredge v. Taylor, 339 P.3d 888, 890-91 (Okla. 2014); Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d
217, 218 (Okla. 2015). Ramey refers to in loco parentis cases giving custody to nonparents,
but the case it cites involves parental abandonment. Id. at 221 (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 75
P.2d 1132, 1133 (Okla. 1938)).
172. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 2000). Rubano's only comparable precedent was a case in which a mother was equitably estopped from denying her husband's
marital presumption. Id. at 967-68 (discussing Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909 (R.I.
1990)).
173. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 164 (Wash. 2005). L.B. cites two lower court
cases recognizing a functional parent, but in each case the court found denying non-parental
custody would harm the child. In re Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d 16 (Wash. App. Ct. 1981);
In re Custody of Stell, 783 P.2d 615, 618 (Wash. App. Ct. 1989) (child with history of abuse
and resulting psychological problems; father entrusted child to aunt's custody for several
years; father was transient, lacked a residence for the child, and had proven unable to fulfill
his child's needs).
174. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 164 n.2 (W. Va. 2005) (Benjamin, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (describing prior psychological parent cases as limited to child abandonment cases).
175. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 164-65 (Wash. 2005); Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at
498-99 (acknowledging the court is crafting new definition of parentage to ensure equality
between different and same-sex parents). I assume in this analysis that there is no competing claim by the genetic father; regardless, the non-biological mother and the non-biological
father are also in parity with respect to this third parental claim.
176. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 453 (Md. 2016).
177. Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 164-65 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (man adopted
parental role for one year while uncertain about genetic parentage and, after finding out he
was not the biological father, shared custody four days a week for eight years).
178. Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982); Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d
731, 736-738 (Ark. 2011) (relying on Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W.3d 140, 140 (Ark.
2005)); see John DeWitt Gregory, Defining the Family in the Millennium: The Troxel Follies,
32 U. MEM. L. REV. 687, 692 (2002). I say more about these cases infra Section I.B. 1.
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First, these non-biological mothers should have been legal mothers
under assisted reproduction statutes. Under the UPA (2002), if a
woman and a man sign a document expressing their shared intent for
him to be the father of a child that she conceives with donated sperm,
then he is the legal father. 17 9 If this provision had been applied irrespective of gender, these women might have had binding preconception
agreements. They planned conception through ART with the shared
intent to parent together. 180 Some even signed written co-parenting
agreements. 181
In recent years, many states extended assisted reproduction statutes to same-sex couples. 1 82 A few courts have held the constitution
demands ART statutes be interpreted without regard to sex. 183 Reproductive technology statutes that still apply only to married couples
raise additional hard questions about the retroactive treatment of
same-sex couples and about illegitimacy or marital status discrimination. Nevertheless, these problems do not apply to the new uniform
acts. The assisted reproduction and surrogacy provisions of the UPA
(2017) apply without regard to the sex or marital status of the intended
parents. 1 84

Second, many of these non-biological mothers should have qualified
as parents under a marital presumption.18 1 Under the UPA (2002), a
husband is the presumed father of any child born to his wife during
the marriage.186 All of these same-sex couples planned to have children
during long-term, committed relationships: some were married 8 7 or

179. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 704 (AM. LAW INST. 2002) [hereinafter UPA (2002)].
Some states allow only married couples to take advantage of ART provisions, but these statutes should apply to married same-sex couples. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
180. Conover, 146 A3d at 435; Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491; Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 2000); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
181. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (Mass. 1999).
182. NeJaime, supra note 14, at 2294 (also detailing continuing struggle to reform law
to facilitate intentional parenthood for same-sex couples through assisted reproduction).
183. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 344 (Fla. 2013); Gartner v. Iowa Dept. of Public
Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 354 (Iowa 2013) (applying state equal protection law); Roe v.
Patton, 2015 WL 4476734, at *3 (D. Utah 2015). Some states use the common law of contracts
to similar effect. In re T.P.S., 978 N.E.2d 1070, 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012); Eldredge v. Taylor,
339 P.3d 888, 893 (Okla. 2014).
184. Supra notes 19-20.
185. See Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathersto Lesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 289 (2003);
Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumptionof Legitimacy in the
Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 246 (2006) (discussing less desirable values
served by marital presumptions, such as establishing heterosexual nuclear family as an ideal
family or facilitating husband's ownership of children); Douglas NeJaime, MarriageEquality
and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1241-49 (2016).
186. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).
187. A.J.B. v. AG.B., 180 A.3d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
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domestic partners,1 8 8 while others held commitment ceremonies because their state offered them no status.1 8 9 If the law had not discriminated against same-sex relationships, many of these women would
have been presumed legal mothers.
Some states have interpreted their marital presumptions to apply
to same-sex spouses, either on their own judgment or under pressure
from Obergefell.190 The UPA (2017) adopts this conclusion across the
board, avoiding sex or gender pronouns whenever possible.191 Of
course, some states still refuse to extend the marital presumption to
same-sex spouses, arguing it rests on the assumption that husbands
are likely genetic fathers. 1 9 2 This argument conflicts with Pavan v.
Smith, which held Arkansas must list same-sex parents on birth certificates despite the state's argument that husbands receive this benefit only because of their likely genetic fatherhood. 193 In any case, this
biological interpretation of the marital presumption fits the state law
doctrine poorly, as Susan Appleton has argued. 1 9 4 A marital father may
retain his parental status, even if the admitted evidence demonstrates
that he is not the genetic father, as long as the court concludes treating
him as the father is in the child's best interests.195 Accordingly, to
Appleton, "[T]he presumption today reflects the belief that someone
legally connected to the woman bearing the child likely planned for the
child, demonstrated a willingness to assume responsibility, or provided support (emotional and/or economic) during the pregnancy, in
turn supporting the expected child."1 9 6 This marital presumption
should apply equally to same -and-different-sex spouses.1 97
Third, even if unmarried and without an agreement, these nonbiological mothers should have qualified as parents under the holding-out

188. Conover v. Conover, 146 A3d 433, 435 (Md. 2016); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912
A2d 951, 956 (Vt. 2006); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth AC.C, 61 N.E.3d 488, 491-92 (N.Y.2016).
189. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490; E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Mass. 1999).
190. LC v. MG & Child Support Enft Agency, 430 P.3d 400, 411-12 (Haw. 2018) (statutory interpretation); McLaughlin v. Jones ex rel. Cty. of Pima, 401 P.3d 492, 496-98 (Ariz.
2017) (required by federal right to marry); see also Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell's Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 67-68 (2017) (describing preObergefell cases in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Arizona, and Missouri).
191. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). Extending the marital
presumption to spouses of a biological father (his husband or his wife) raises different and
difficult questions about the rights of the gestational mother. Appleton, supra note 185, at
260-61; NeJaime, supra note 14, at 2339-40.
192. In InterestofAE., No. 09-16-00019-CV, 2017WL 1535101, at *8 (Tex. App. Apr. 27, 2017).
193. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (rejecting similar argument).
194. Appleton, supra note 185, at 285-86.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.

936

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:909

presumption.1 9 8 Under the UPA (2002), a man is the presumed father
of a child if, "for the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the
same household with the child and openly held out the child as his
own."' 9 9 These non-biological mothers had resided with their children
for more than two years. 2 0 0 They had strong evidence of holding out:
the couples taught their child to call the non-biological mother some
variant of "mom," they gave the child her surname, they listed both
adults as mothers in birth announcements and in religious ceremonies, and both adults signed medical and school forms as parents. 2 0 1 If
the residential presumption had been gender-neutral, then these nonbiological mothers would have been presumed legal mothers. 202
Several state supreme courts have interpreted their residential presumption to encompass non-biological mothers in same-sex couples. 2 03
Many paternity statutes follow the UPA (1973) by stating their provisions apply equally to mothers insofar as practical. 2 0 4 On the other
hand, the 1973 residential presumption requires a father to hold the
child out as his "natural child," which some courts interpret to mean
biological child. 2 05 Other states, in contrast, have interpreted this language to protect non-biological fathers and mothers. 2 06 The residential
presumption in the UPA (2017) drops this "natural" modifier and applies without regard to gender. 2 07
Last, most of these nonbiological mothers were in committed relationships with the birth mothers at the time of birth. Federal law requires all states to offer a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity that
198.

See Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Partiesto Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 212-16 (2014) (tracing progression of California precedent leading to the application of the residential presumption to lesbian co-parents).
199. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002).
200. E.g., Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 435 (Md. 2016) (petitioner lived with child
until she was 17 months old, then had overnight and weekend visitation until she was 25
months old); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 892 (petitioner lived with child until four);
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421-22 (same); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth
A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 491 (N.Y. 2016) (petitioner lived with child until he was one, then had
regular overnight visitation until he was three).
201. E.g., E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889.
202. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (extending residential presumption to same-sex couple instead of de facto parenthood).
203. Id. at 669; Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 288 (N.M. 2012); Partanen v. Gallagher,
59 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Mass. 2016); In re Guardianship of Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 501 (N.H.
2014).

and Their Children, 77

204.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 21 (UNIF.

LAW COMM'N 1973).

205. L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 915 (Wyo. 2014); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4105(1)(d) (West 2008) ("A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if ... he receives
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child .... ) (emphasis
added) (adopting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973)).
206. E.g., Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d at 293-94; see also Polikoff, supra note 198, at
216-17 (citing California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Kansas).
207. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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allows the birth mother and alleged genetic father to agree to identify
him as the legal father. 2 08 After a sixty-day rescission period, the form
is binding on the parties as if it were a legal judgment. 2 0 9 While these
forms were clearly designed to identify genetic fathers without the expense of adjudication, the UPA (2017) introduces a parallel voluntary
"acknowledgement of parentage" that allows the birth mother to
acknowledge parentage of a genetic, intended, or presumed parent, regardless of sex or gender. 2 1 0 It remains to be seen if many states will
accept this procedure, but it would be a fourth avenue for intended
parents to obtain legal status.
When parentage law stops discriminating on the basis of gender,
non-biological mothers in same-sex couples may become parents
through assisted reproduction provisions, the marital presumption,
the residential presumption, or voluntary acknowledgements of parentage. De facto parenthood is largely redundant in the very class of
cases that motivated courts to adopt it.
Of course, even reformed parentage rules may be under-inclusive.
Same-sex couples who conceived before the revisions will fall between
the cracks. They did not satisfy the presumptions or assisted reproduction statutes in force when they conceived. Other couples may not have
foreseen the formalities required by the new reformed statutes. For
example, while the UPA (2017) allows oral preconception agreements, 211 many states insist on a written contract. In C.G. v. J.H., the
parents decided to conceive together without a written agreement, and
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to recognize the non-biological parent based merely on subjective intent and function. 2 1 2 De facto
parenthood could play a gap-filling role that softens the formal rules
to recognize these parents.
Of course, a more precise route to avoid injustice would be to create
retroactive statutory or equitable exceptions. This narrower route
seems appropriate because exceptions are harder to justify after the
legal reforms. Lawmakers may demand written agreements to clarify
the parties' intent ex ante and avoid unreliable decisions based on parole evidence and evolving ideas after the birth. Allowing petitioners
to use de facto parentage to avoid the writing requirement may undermine the legislatures' intended benefits. Similar arguments could apply to other reformed parentage statutes. Lawmakers may require two
years of co-residence for the holding out because they prefer a certain
date to unreliable battles between psychological experts. In that case,
208.
209.

42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(i) (2019).
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2019).

210.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

211.
212.

§ 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
See id. at § 704 (permitting oral agreements with clear and convincing evidence).
C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 904 (Pa. 2018).

938

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:909

allowing de facto parent claims for shorter periods of co-residence recreates the precise problem the residential presumption sought to
avoid. 2 13 Existing formal limits on parentage may not be ideal. But if
they can be improved, we should debate modifying their limits, rather
than supplanting them with blanket ad hoc standards.
2. Adding a Second Parent: Substitute for Adoption
(a) A and B agree to adopt and raise a child together, but only A
adopts. Nevertheless, A and B hold B out as the child's parent, and the
child regardsB as a parent. B lives with the child and fulfills caretaking responsibilitiesfor several years.
(b) A is the legal parent of the child. A and B would like B to adopt
the child, but B never adopts. Nevertheless, A and B hold B out as the
child's parent, and the child regards B as a parent. B lives with the
child and fulfills caretakingresponsibilitiesfor several years.
Some litigants use de facto parenthood as a substitute for adoption. 2 1 4 Indeed, Jeffrey Parness refers to it as "informal adoption." 2 15 In
some cases, two adults plan to adopt and raise a child together, but
only one parent completes the adoption process. For example, in
Sinnott v. Peck, a same-sex couple decided to adopt an infant from
Guatemala, but the only feasible adoption agency would not serve
same-sex couples. 2 1 6 One adult adopted the child initially, and the couple planned a civil union so they could perform a second-parent adoption in Vermont. 2 17 Unfortunately, personal and familial illnesses prevented them from completing the ceremony. 218 Nevertheless, the nonadoptive mother was fully involved in all caretaking activities, and the
213. But see RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82, cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST.
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (rejecting "necessarily arbitrary" set time period in favor of
judicial determination that petitioner occupied "a parental role for a length of time sufficient
to have established a bond and dependent relationship"). Broad judicial standards can be a
rational supplement to formal rules, if false negatives are more likely than false positives.
Suppose legislators believe (1) few judges are excessively eager to recognize functional parents and (2) legislators can identify general situations where functional parentage is appropriate but judges are unlikely to find parentage. Legislators could define parentage rules
that prevent judges from failing to recognize functional parents in these clear cases (reducing
false negatives), while the parentage standard allows judges to recognize functional parents
in situations unforeseen by the formal rule (with few false positives). If these premises are
true, this is a sound argument against treating parentage provisions as exhaustive, although
I have not seen anyone make this argument for the UPA's structure. Thanks to Fred Schauer
for raising this argument.
214. E.g., Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 606-08 (Mont. 2009).
215. Jeffrey A Parness, Formalitiesfor Informal Adoptions, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 375 (2015).
216. Sinnott v. Peck, 180 A.3d 560, 562, 572 (Vt. 2017); cf. Smith v. Gordon, 968 A2d 1,
14 (Del. 2009) (superseded by statute); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 562 (Colo. App. 2004)
(only visitation under a harm standard); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 685 (Vt. 1997)
(rejecting de facto parenthood on similar facts).
217. Sinnott, 180 A.3d at 572.
218. Id. at 562.
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child called her "Mom."2 19 Four years later, the parents ended their
relationship amicably and shared custody equally for three years. 22 0
Then, when their child was seven, the adoptive mother tried to sever
all contact between the child and the second mother. 2 2 1
This scenario is similar to a preconception agreement case. The
Vermont Supreme Court concluded that when two adults intend to
take on joint responsibility for a new child, "there is no principled basis
for distinguishing a couple that decides to bring a child into their family through donor insemination and childbirth from a couple in which
one of the mothers adopts pursuant to a joint plan to acquire and parent a child together." 2 2 2 Both adults subjectively intend to be equal legal parents, but they fail to complete the formalities because adoption
is impractical or costly. 2 23 Sometimes the parents seek other legal-

sounding substitutes, like changing the child's birth certificate and
surname. 22 4 State law may excuse their failure to comply with adoption
formalities, recognizing their intent and follow-through. 2 25
The second set of adoption-related cases raises different issues,
which are well illustrated by Kilborn v. Carey.226 Carey moved in with
Kilborn when her daughter was two months old. 2 27 The biological father had "removed himself from his daughter's life." 2 2 8 Four months
later, Carey and Kilborn married. 2 2 9 Their wedding ceremony included

"an informal 'adoption' ceremony called 'sprouts and roots,' which celebrated their union as a family and held the child out to their family
and friends as Kilborn's 'adopted' daughter in spirit and intention." 23 0
For the next four years, Kilborn was the family's primary wage earner
and provided "day-to-day care" for the child, who referred to him as
"daddy." 23 1 Carey and Kilborn discussed adoption, but the biological

219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 562-63.
222. Id. at 573 n.6.
223. Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 744 (S.C. 2008); Fryv. Caudill, 554 S.W.3d 866,
867-68 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018) (legal mother worried adoption would lead to loss of children's
'medical card").
224. Inoue v. Inoue, 185 P.3d 834, 848-49 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008); Fry, 554 S.W.3d at 868;
Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774, 778 (Nev. 2017).
225. Some states have long recognized "equitable adoption" to excuse formalities, but
this doctrine is limited to probate not custody determinations. In re Parentage of Scarlett
Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 792 (Ill. 2015).
226. 140 A.3d 461, 462 (Me. 2016).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 463.
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father refused to consent. 23 2 The couple separated when Carey's first
child was four. 233 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld the trial
court's conclusion that Kilburn was the child's de facto parent.23 4
Unlike in the first scenario, here one party begins as a recognized
legal parent while the other has no legal status. Yet, as in the first
scenario, both adults intend for the new partner to be a legal parent.
Only legal impediments stand in the way. Carey and Kilborn could not
act on their intention to adopt because the noncustodial legal parent
did not consent. Other couples cannot adopt because of discrimination.
Many states allow second-parent adoption only to married stepparents, 235 which until recently precluded same-sex adoption. 23 6 Although
the new parent lacks legal status, both adults regard her as a full parent, and she takes on substantial parental roles. Some states may, like
Vermont, choose to regard these cases as analogous to preconception
agreements.
On the other hand, states may hesitate to use de facto parenthood
in either adoption situation because the doctrine is not merely filling
gaps but openly circumventing adoption law. 237 Adoption's substantive
and procedural rules were designed to establish new parents in ways
consistent with the constitutional rights of existing parents and with
the child's welfare. 23 8 A child can be adopted only if he is "available" for
adoption, which means either the child has no legal parents or the parents consent to the adoption. 23 9 Existing legal parents must have notice
of the adoption proceeding and an opportunity to contest it. 2 4 0 If the
legal parent does not consent, the adoption cannot proceed unless her
rights are terminated for neglect, abandonment, or other statutory factors.

241

Even if the child is available for adoption, public officials must

investigate the adoptive parent and approve of the home placement. 242
These rules reflect state judgments about how much to encourage
stepparent relationships, how much to investigate adoptive parents,
and how to do all of this consistent with the rights of existing parents.
232. Id. at 463, 466.
233. Id. at 462-63.
234. Id. at 467.
MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF ADOPTION 2 (2008).
236. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 382 (Neb. 2002).
237. Id.; V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A2d 539, 553 (2000) (admitting the doctrine substitutes for
adoption).
238. Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 90-91 (2006); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, § 2-401, commentary (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1994) (describing how consent provisions were crafted to accommodate the Supreme
Court s unwed father cases).
239. See JASPER, supra note 235, at 39.
240. Id. at 44-45.
241. Id. at 46-47.
242. Id. at 14-15.
235.
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Perhaps adoption law is too strict. Maybe states should readily grant
second-parent adoptions over the objection of noncustodial parents, as
the court did in Kilborn. One court has held de facto parenthood does
not require consent by noncustodial parents, as long as they know
about the relationship. 2 43 Maybe states should overlook discriminatory
foreign adoption laws and forgive parents' failure to adopt due to expense or inconvenience, as the court did in Sinnott. Indeed, some scholars support de facto parenthood because they believe the failure to
adopt should be excused because it is expensive, time consuming, or
intrusive. 2 4 4 Maybe states should permit joint adoption by unmarried
couples or by multiple people. Some scholars support de facto
parenthood because they believe the law should accommodate three
parents, even over parental objection. 2 45
As I said above, I do not intend to resolve such policy debates. My
point is that where de facto parenthood overlaps adoption law, the new
parentage standard empowers judges to resolve policy debates using
ad hoc discretion in ways that will differ from the adoption statutes
and will vary between judges. Instead of adopting a sweeping functional parent test that empowers courts to resolve policy disagreements under the facade of a best interests analysis, reformers should
face these policy choices openly.
3.

RepresentationAbout Parentage:Substitute for Estoppel

A is the legalparent. A tells B that B is a biological or legal parent.
B relies on A's statement to take on a caretakingrole for a substantial
period of time and for the child to regard B as a parent. If A tries to
deny B's parentage to avoid sharing custody, B may equitably estop A
from denying her representationabout B's parentage.

243. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 982-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) ("consent of
both legal parents is not required to create a psychological parent relationship between their
child and a third party," but lack of consent by one parent is one factor to consider under the
best interests test). ContraIn re Parentage of M.F., 228 P.3d 1270, 1273-74 (Wash. 2010);
Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 748 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding de facto parent statute
unconstitutional as applied to permit boyfriend seeking parental rights as against two fit
legal parents).
244. Nancy Polikoff, The New "Illegitimacy:"Winning Backward in the Protection of the
Childrenof Lesbian Couples, 20AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y& L. 721, 733-34 (2012); Jessica
Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in
Light of Same-Sex Parents'IncreasedAccess to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83
BROOK. L. REV. 55, 95 (2017). See also NeJaime, supra note 14, at 2317-23 (arguing against
adoption as a substitute for binding preconception agreements).
245. Sacha M. Coupet, 'Ain't I a Parent?": The Exclusion of Kinship Caregiversfrom the Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 595, 636-40 (2010).
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A is the legal parent. B tells A that B will be a parent of the child,
and A and the child rely on that statement. If B later tries to deny parentage to avoid paying child support, A may equitably estop B from
denying her prior representation.
Many de facto parenthood cases involve facts that would justify application of equitable estoppel.2 4 6 In general, equitable estoppel prevents a litigant from contradicting his past misrepresentations, if it
will unfairly harm those he induced to rely on his statements. 2 47 Courts
often use estoppel to prevent parties from rebutting the parentage presumptions. A father may be estopped from rebutting the marital presumption to avoid child support if he told the child he was its father
knowing he was not its genetic father. 2 4 8 Conversely, a mother may be
estopped from rebutting the marital presumption to avoid sharing custody with her husband, if she told him that he was the child's father
and he relied on her to develop a parental relationship over a substantial period. 2 4 9 These principles developed around the marital presumption but now extend to non-marital parents, 25 0 albeit with less certain
results.

251

Equitable estoppel can overlap functional parentage. 25 2 Debra H v.
Janice R, for example, is a preconception agreement case with an estoppel twist.253 The social mother, Janice, alleged she entered an oral

246. E.g., Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 164-65 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (biological
mother misled former long-term boyfriend, who nevertheless maintained informal custody
four nights a week despite DNA test); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 961-62 (R.I. 2000)
(parties entered a written settlement agreement awarding custody to non-biological mother,
which court held estopped biological mother from denying maternity-without addressing
whether non-biological mother could be a de facto parent in the first instance).
247. T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation,
27 REV. LITIG. 377, 387 (2008) (quoting Pickard v. Sears, 112 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. (1837));
Bergan v. Bergan, 572 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
248. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 716 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); W. v. W., 728
A.2d 1076, 1085 (Conn. 1999); Johnson v. Johnson, 286 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Mich. Ct. App.
1979); Knillv. Knill, 510 A.2d 546, 551 (Md. 1986); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage,
Parentage,and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 230 (2011); see also Nguyen v. Boynes, 396
P.3d 774, 777-78 (Nev. 2017) (non-biological parent obligated to pay support if he promised
to adopt and in reasonable reliance, the biological father's parental rights are terminated).
249. In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995); Pettinato v.
Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 912 (R.I. 1990). Some courts apply estoppel only to prevent wives
from rebutting marital paternity. Lake v. Putnam, 894 N.W.2d 62, 65 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
250. E.g., Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 2006).
251. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 248, at 233-37.
252. Inoue v. Inoue, 185 P.3d 834, 848-49 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) (biological mother met
man while pregnant, married him, changed birth certificate, and represented the child was
adopted).
253. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 184 (N.Y. 2010), abrogated by In re Brooke
S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 500 (N.Y. 2016) (recognizing preconception agreement as path to parentage).
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parenting agreement with the biological mother, Debra. 25 4 Debra, who
was a lawyer, assured Janice that Janice was a legal parent even without adoption, which would require unnecessary and intrusive state approval. 255 The New York Court of Appeals refused to apply equitable
estoppel because the legislature codified estoppel for support but not
visitation. 25 6 Imagine instead that New York recognized written preconception agreements. In that situation, perhaps Debra should be estopped from disproving Janice's motherhood. Later New York cases
use equitable estoppel to prevent a biological parent from rebutting
the marital presumption in a same-sex relationship. 25 7
Although equitable estoppel and de facto parenthood are often
equated, their distinct elements reflect distinct moral concerns. 25 8
Most important, estoppel focuses on misrepresentations. This "allays
concerns" about the rights of the legal parent, who cannot in fairness
complain because the law refuses to allow her to benefit from her own
misrepresentations. 25 9 This element limits the use of estoppel to impose paternity on unwilling fathers. When a father had no reason to
doubt his genetic paternity, many courts find he did not knowingly
make false statements to the child and cannot be estopped from ending
the relationship. 2 6 0 De facto parenthood, in contrast, is unconcerned
with misrepresentations, knowing or otherwise. The legal parent must
foster the new relationship, but she need not make any representations about parental status. 2 6 1 The de facto parent must assume parental obligations, but she need not make false representations about being the child's parent.

254. See Debra H v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822, at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 2, 2008).
255. Id. at *4 ("[W]e don't need an adoption. You are his parent. I am a lawyer. I know
the court system. We don't want the Courts to get involved."), discussed in Feinberg, supra
note 244, at 99 (citing appellate briefs).
256. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 191; see also Josh Smolow, Can EquitableEstoppel Be Used

As an Effective Way for A Legal Parent to Obtain Child Support for the Children of A Separated Same-Sex Couple?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 481, 486-87 (2012).
257. E.g., Christopher Y.Y. v. Jessica Z.Z., 69 N.Y. S. 3d 887, 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
258. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A2d 73, 83 n.7 (Md. 2008). Jeffrey A. Parness and
Matthew Timko argue de facto parenthood supersedes equitable estoppel, but the fact that
the doctrines conflict does not show one supersedes the other. De Facto Parent and Nonparent Child Support Orders, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 805 (2018).

259. Nicole M. Riel, The Other Mother: ProtectingNon-BiologicalMothers in Same-Sex
Marriages,31 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 387, 403 (2018).
260. See Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the
MaritalPresumption, 65 MD. L. REV. 246, 262 (2006).
261.

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT

§ 609

(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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Second, only a victim who reasonably relied on false representations can assert estoppel, and only the person who made the representations is estopped. 2 6 2 As a result, if both parents knew the husband
was not the genetic father, then many courts refuse to apply estoppel
principles. 2 63 Other courts still apply estoppel if the child relied on the
parents' misrepresentations and will suffer if one of them denies paternity. 2 6 4 Even here, courts require a detriment to the child beyond
"the emotional harm that a child experiences as a result of a parent's
rejection," such as financial harm or interference with another paternal relationship. 2 65 In addition, because estoppel applies only among
the parties to the statement, it cannot alter the rights of third parties.
The wife's false statements to her husband do not prevent a putative
father from claiming paternity. 2 66 In contrast, many de facto parent
cases involve a cohabitant or relative asserting rights to custody or
visitation against another, noncustodial parent.
Finally, equitable estoppel is a defense, not a cause of action. A
party can use estoppel to prevent someone from rebutting a parentage
presumption, but estoppel cannot create legal rights where none existed. 2 67 This could have interesting consequences. Equitable estoppel
can coherently divide an adult's rights and duties to a child. Suppose
a man and woman agree to have a child by artificial insemination with
donor sperm, but then the man leaves his partner during pregnancy. 2 68
Because estoppel focuses on unfairness to the child and to the mother
induced to shoulder parental burdens, estoppel can coherently impose
(some) support payments on the man without giving him parental
rights. In contrast, strong de facto parenthood carries the full suite of
parental rights and duties, or none at all. The man who left his pregnant partner never had any relationship with the child, so he cannot
be a de facto parent with a duty of support. The unified status of de
facto parenthood can also have troubling consequences. Some courts
are reluctant to impose support duties on unwilling de facto parents,
even if they satisfy the test and could have used the doctrine to assert

262. Soltis v. First of Am. Bank-Muskegon, 513 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
But see T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in Modern Litigation,
27 REV. LITIG. 377, 389-91 (2008) (recognizing substantial case law requires reliance, but
noting many courts no longer demand reliance if necessary to prevent manifest injustice).
263. E.g. Barber v. Barber, 77 P.3d 576, 579-80 (Okla. 2003).
264. Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610, 616 (N.Y. 2006). If the equities between or
among the adults are now irrelevant because estoppel turns "exclusively on the best interests
of the child," id., then equitable estoppel and de facto parenthood have effectively collapsed.
265. Singer, supra note 260, at 262.
266. But see Juanita A v. Kenneth Mark N., 930 N.E.2d 214, 216 (N.Y. 2010) (discussed
in Carbone & Cahn, supra note 248, at 230).
267. See White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
268. Smolow, supra note 256, at 499; Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1994).
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parental rights. 2 6 9 This is also the position of the UPA (2017).270 De
facto parenthood thus becomes troublingly asymmetric. The de facto
parent can have the benefits and duties of parenthood if he is willing,
but he need not risk parental responsibilities if he declines the opportunity.
4.

Entrustment:Substitute for In Loco Parentisor Abandonment

A is the legal parent. A leaves the child with B, a cohabitant, relative, or friend. A intends to return for the child but has little or no contact with the child for a substantialperiod of time. B takes on all parental roles for the child.
Many de facto parent cases involve something akin to abandonment. 27 1 In this class of cases, a legal parent leaves her child with a
cohabitant, relative, or friend, often because the parent is suffering
from mental health or substance abuse problems or is serving a prison
sentence .272
In McDonel v. Sohn, for example, a child often stayed with her aunt
and uncle because of her mother's "serious psychological problems." 27 3
The child had little contact with her biological father until she was
three, when he began seeing her one weekend a month. 27 4 After the
mother committed suicide, the trial court awarded the aunt and uncle
primary custody. 27 5 The appellate court affirmed, noting that the aunt
and uncle's "commitment to raising [the child] and their willingness to
accept the parental responsibility was the reason [she] thrived developmentally." 27 6 The aunt in McDonel sought custody against the noncustodial father, but in other cases, relatives seek custody against the
parent who entrusted a child to their care. 27 7

269. See Parness & Timko, supra note 258, at 799-800. But see Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759
A.2d 959, 976 (R.I. 2000).
270. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM. 2017).
271. E.g., Kilborn v. Carey, 140 A.3d 461, 465-66 (Me. 2016) (father saw his daughter
only twice in four years and knew she was being cared for by mother's boyfriend); Francies
v. Francies, 759 N.E.2d 1106, 1116-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding grandparent custody
that offered more stable emotional and financial support because mother voluntarily relinquished custody for months to travel for dating relationships).
272. E.g., Eaton v. Paradis, 91 A.3d 590, 592 (Me. 2014).
273. 762 A.2d 1101, 1103, 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
274. Id. at 1103.
275. Id. at 1102.
276. Id. at 1108-09 (quoting trial court findings) (alterations added).
277. E.g., Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 710, 717-18 (Neb. 2016) (birth mother suffering from postpartum depression intended to entrust newborn temporarily to grandmother's
care); J.W. v. R.J.R., No. AFD-07-42-09, 2010 WL 520505, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Feb. 16, 2010) (grandmother intended to adopt grandchild but was not granted custody because she was contesting her own neglect allegations, so she entrusted child to great-aunt,
who later asserted de facto parenthood in effort to retain custody).
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The facts of McDonel are tragic but not novel. Parents have always
turned to relatives and friends for help, and the law has long allowed
parents to delegate their parental authority to " 'the capable and loving
hands' of a relative when the parent is unable to care for the child." 27 8
Under the common law, someone who has control of a child and intends to accept parental duties without adoption is said to stand in loco
parentis, or "in the place of a parent."27 9 When a parent leaves their
child in a nonparent's physical custody, the nonparent stands in loco
parentis. 2 80 Stepparents who accept a stepchild into their home stand
also in loco parentis, although being a stepparent alone does not generate freestanding or ongoing rights or duties. 2 8 1
During the relationship, a person acting in loco parentis has the
same legal rights and duties as a parent. 2 8 2 He has a duty to care for
the child and provide necessary food, shelter, and clothing, and thus
can be held liable for injuries caused by neglect.2 83 Creditors who provide the child with necessities can sue him. 2 8 4 He has a right to discipline the child, 2 8 5 and at common law he had a right to the child's labor
without payment. 2 86 Under modern statutes, he may also have the
power to make medical, schooling or other custodial decisions. 287 Un-

278. Windham, 887 N.W.2d at 718.
279. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001) (discussing Logan v. Murray,
6 Serg. & Rawle 175, 178 (Pa. 1820)); see generally 28 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 545
(1981). In its common law origins, in loco parentis also enabled fathers to delegate rights to
a master, tutor, or schoolmaster. John C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis
in the United States 1765-1985, 8 J. LEGAL HISTORY 260, 260 (1987).
280. Moritz v. Garnhart, 7 Watts 302, 1838 WL 3244, at *1 (Pa. 1838) (grandfather had
right to custody of illegitimate child because he had acted in loco parentis since her birth);
Farve v. Medders, 128 So. 2d 877, 878-80 (Miss. 1961) (friend acting in loco parentis at
mother's request had right to custody superior to grandparents).
281. Lantz v. Frey, 14 Pa. 201, 202 (Pa. 1850) (stepparent); In re Adoption of Tompkins,
20 S.W.3d 385, 386-87 (Ark. 2000) (stepparent). Many cases rely on 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *192 (O.W.Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1878) (Stepfather
has no duty to support stepchild, but if "he takes the wife's child into his own house, he is
then considered as standing in loco parentis, and is responsible for the maintenance and
education of the child so long as it lives with him.").
282. Commonwealth v. Gerstner, 656 A.2d 108, 112 (Pa. 1995); Young v. Hipple, 117
A. 185, 188 (Pa. 1922).
283. Nelson v. Johansen, 24 N.W. 730, 730 (Neb. 1885) (defendant stood in loco parentis
for child living and working in his home, so he could be liable in negligence for allowing her
to walk back home to her parents through winter storm with inadequate clothing); Clasen v.
Pruhs, 95 N.W. 640, 641 (Neb. 1903) (German citizens sent their children to live with aunt
in America and later sued aunt in her capacity in loco parentis for failing to clothe or feed
the child adequately).
284. Margaret M. Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-ChildRelationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 42 (1984).
285. McReynolds v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1149, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Snow v.
England, 862 N.E.2d 664, 666 (Ind. 2007) (school discipline)).
286. Lantz v. Frey, 14 Pa. 201, 201-02 (Pa. 1850).
287. Commonwealth v. Gerstner, 656 A.2d 108, 112 n.6 (Pa. 1995).
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like parental rights, however, these rights are temporary. Traditionally, once the relationship ends, neither the child nor the surrogate
parent has ongoing rights or duties, including to support, inheritance,
decisional authority, custody, or visitation. 2 88
The in loco parentis relationship can be terminated by the surrogate, the child, or the legal parent.2 8 9 Some scholars argue parents cannot revoke in loco parentis status. 2 90 They draw on a line of cases tracing back to a 1978 Utah Supreme Court case, Gribble v. Gribble.2 9 1
However, the same court later disavowed Gribble's interpretation of
the common law. 2 9 2 Like the subsequent court, I found no historical
support for this position that parents cannot revoke in loco parentis
status. 293 Quoting a common phrase among cases and treatises,
Gribble claims in loco parentis can be terminated at will by the surrogate parent or by the child. 2 9 4 Gribble assumes this is an exhaustive
list, but its cited cases do not support this assumption. In some of the
cases, courts denied claims for child support against former stepfathers who had acted in loco parentis, noting that a stepparent relationship is voluntary. 2 95 In other cases, an insurer refused to pay a stepchild for a stepparent's life insurance, arguing the in loco parentisrelationship ended because the child was grown and married. 2 96 Courts
reject the insurer's self-interested position, holding the relationship
persists as long as the child and surrogate choose. 2 97 None of these
288. Mahoney, supra note 284, at 42.
289. Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 812 (Utah 2007); Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d
710, 716 (Neb. 2016); Rosky v Schmitz, 188 P. 493, 494 (Wash. 1920).
290. Polikoff, supra note 49, at 507; Hellman, supra note 10, at 57.
291. 583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978).
292. Jones, 154 P.3d at 812-14. Jones's common law interpretation seems correct, even
if the court was motivated in part by hostility to same-sex couples. Katharine T. Bartlett,
PrioritizingPast Caretakingin Child-CustodyDecisionmaking, 77 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
29, 66 (2014).
293. See generally Carignan v. Carignan (1989), 61 Man. R. 2d 66 (Can. Man. Ct. App.)
(surveying the common law of England, America, and Canada), overruled by Chartier v.
Chartier, [1999] D.L.R. 4th 540 (Can. S.C.C.) (holding statutory use of "in loco parentis" need
not follow the common law). However, in loco parentis has been used to describe the status
of the person to whom a parent voluntarily ceded parental rights through intentional abandonment. In re M.A.F., 334 S.E.2d 668, 671 (Ga. 1985).
294. Gribble, 583 P.2d at 67 (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 364 P.2d 444, 445 (Wash. 1961);
Chestnut v. Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d 269, 270 (S.C. 1966)). Taylor and Chesnut both quoted
State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 91 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 1958), which quoted McDonald v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074, 1076 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) ("the status of
one in loco parentis is temporary, and may be abrogated at will by either the person thus
standing in loco parentis or by the child"). Gribble also cited 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND
CHILD § 9 (formerly 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARENT AND CHILD § 91). See also 67A C.J.S. PARENT
AND CHILD § 366.
295. Taylor, 364 P.2d at 444-45 (support); Chestnut, 147 S.E.2d at 270 (support); Ex rel.
Gilman, 91 N.W.2d at 399 (support).
296. Young v. Hipple, 117 A. 185, 188 (Pa. 1922).
297. Id. at 189.
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cases ask if the legal parent may end this relationship. Moreover, the
Gribble interpretation results in a strange allocation of authority. The
child can disown the surrogate parent; the surrogate parent can disown the child; yet, the legal parent has no say in this relationship?2 98
In any case, over the last forty years, courts have expanded in loco
parentis status beyond its common law roots. In the 1980s, some courts
began invoking it when they awarded visitation to stepparents in divorce. 299 Divorce statutes allowed courts to divide custody over "children of the marriage," and a few courts evoked in loco parentis while
interpreting these provisions to give custody to stepparents who acted
as parents during the marriage.3 00 Later, a handful of states revised
their statutes to give stepparents standing for visitation, while others
3 01
chose to confer standing on anyone who acted in loco parentis.
Another group of states expanded in loco parentis through the common
law, creating a general exception to the rule that only third parties
listed in the statute have standing to seek visitation.3 02
How does the expanded in loco parentis relate to strong de facto
parenthood? Some scholars and courts treat them as interchangeable,3 03 but they are distinct in principle and practice.3 0 4 Most important,
a person acting in place of a parent does not become a parent, but remains a "third party."3 05 Consequently, to receive visitation or custody,
she must still rebut the parental presumption.3 06 Second, in loco parentis is still a temporary status occupied with the legal parent's consent.
Even where the law gives her an ongoing right to visitation, the
broader powers, rights, and duties of the parent-like status terminate
with the relationship. In loco parentis is more akin to guardianship
298. Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 814 (Utah 2007); Foust v. Montez-Torres, 456 S.W.3d
736, 738-39 (Ark. 2015).
299. Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); see Hellman, supra note
10, at 53; Bowman, supra note 135, at 137.
300. Spells, 378 A.2d at 881-83; Carter v. Broderick, 644 P.2d 850, 853-54 (Alaska 1982).
301. Hellman, supranote 10, at 53 (citing five states with stepparent statutes and many
where stepparents receive visitation under other provisions). Arizona's statute redefines in
loco parentis broadly; e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-401 (2013); Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d
312, 314 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing common law supplanted by statutory definition
as "a person who has been treated as a parent by the child and who has formed a meaningful
parental relationship with the child for a substantial period of time").
302. J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (in loco parentis applied
to lesbian couple with preconception agreement) (endorsed in T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913,
917-18 (Pa. 2001).
303. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. at 50-51 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
304. C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d 891, 906-07 (Pa. 2018) (refusing to recognize intentional parentage based on oral preconception agreement).
305. See id. at 911 n. 17; Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So.3d 33, 35-37 (Miss. 2013);
306. Polikoff, supra note 49, at 515-16 (describing third-party visitation cases that give
standing to seek visitation to persons acting in loco parentis, but then refusing to lower the
substantive standard); Bowman, supra note 135, at 137. But see Bethany v. Jones, 378
S.W.3d 731, 738 (Ark. 2011).
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than parentage. Some statutes authorize parents to appoint a temporary guardian, delegating to the guardian their duty of care and right
to control the child.3 07 A parent may revoke this guardianship, and
courts must presume that returning to parental custody is in the
child's best interests. 3 08
In loco parentis and statutory guardianship cover situations when
a parent entrusts a child temporarily to the care of nonparents. But
what if the arrangement is more enduring? For long-term custody,
mechanisms exist to protect the relationship that develops between
the child and non-parental caregiver.
When parents leave their children with third parties for a substantial period of time, usually six months or a year, many states allow the
caregiver to seek custody under a "de facto custodian" statute.3 09 These
statutes apply if the parents are "absent"3 10 or do not have physical
custody.3 1 1 If a parent does return and manage to regain custody, the
former de facto custodian may still have standing to seek visitation.3 12
When the parent abandons his child permanently, then the custodial
caregiver can file a petition to adopt the child without the parent's consent.3 13 A parent abandons a child if he engages in voluntary and unex-

307. In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2011).
308. Id. at 781, 783-86 (citing cases in accord from Nebraska, Vermont, Michigan, North
Dakota, Iowa, and Indiana, but noting three contrary cases in Mississippi, California, and
Tennessee); In re Guardianship of Reena D., 35 A.3d 509, 512 (N.H. 2011).
309. See Kathleen Meara, What's in A Name? Defining and GrantingA Legal Status to
Grandparents Who Are Informal Primary Caregivers of Their Grandchildren, 52 FAM. CT.
REV. 128, 133-34 (2014) (citing ten states with de facto custodian statutes and proposing
model act).
310. O'Hearon v. Hansen, 409 P.3d 85, 94 (Utah Ct. App. 2017).
311. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-107(b) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410-123 (1)(b) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.5 (West 2018); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257C.01 subdiv. 2(a) (West 2018) ("[R]esided with the individual without the parent
present and with a lack of demonstrated consistent participation by a parent . . . ."); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-10B-8(B)(3) (West 2015) (resided with petitioner for ninety days and "extraordinary circumstances"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(1) (West 2018); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2015); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-102(a) (2011) (custody for
"primary caregiver" of six months, but without defining primary caregiver).
312. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-123 (1)(c) (West 2012) (if nonparent had physical
custody for 182 days and commences suit within 182 days of returning custody); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2015) (visitation for "a person, other than a foster parent,
who has had actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending
not more than ninety days preceding the date of the filing of the petition"); see also In Interest
of IS., 550 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Tex. 2018) ("The statute does not require the nonparent to have
ultimate legal authority to control the child, nor does it require the parents to have wholly
ceded or relinquished their own parental rights and responsibilities.").
313. Cf Kilborn v. Carey, 140 A.3d 461, 465-66 (Me 2016).
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cused conduct that demonstrates his intent to forgo rights and duties permanently.3 14 Courts and scholars disagree about whether the abandonment test should focus on the parent's subjective intent or on conduct
that is objectively inconsistent with parental rights.3 1 5 While the concept of abandonment may be vague, its endpoints are clear. All states
find abandonment when intent and conduct converge, such as when a
parent chooses to leave his child permanently in another person's care.3 16
On the other end of the spectrum, a parent has not abandoned her child
if she leaves the child temporarily3 17 or if the separation is involuntary.3 1 8
In between these poles, disagreements abound. How much time
must pass without contact before temporary entrustment becomes permanent abandonment? What if the contact is limited and sporadic?
Must the parent provide financial support to avoid abandonment? Sensibly, many statutes try to specify the relevant conduct and period. In
Ohio, a parent abandons his child if he "failed without justifiable cause
to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide
for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or
judicial decree for a period of at least one year."3 19 Even with such guidance, courts must judge whether contact was de minimis3 20 and what

314. Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D., 843 N.W.2d 820, 826-27 (Neb. 2014); C.C. Marvel, What
constitutes abandonment or desertion of child by its parent or parents within purview of adoption laws, in 35 A.L.R.2d § 2; Kristin M. Wirgler, Abandonment AsA GroundforTermination
of ParentalRights, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 333, 335 (2007).
315. See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 503 (N.C. 2010). In the latter case, it would
be more accurate to say continuous failure to perform parental duties is a forfeiture of parental rights. Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 756 N.W.2d 522, 527 (Neb. 2008).
316. E.g., Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 503.
317. G.T. v. Adoption of A.E.T., 725 So. 2d 404, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing
Solomon v. McLucas, 382 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (teenage mother's temporary
inability to care for child not abandonment)); In Re Adoption of Gossett, 277 So. 2d 832 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (father's failure to support daughter for twenty-five months while in
military not abandonment when following discharge he matured and sought to exercise parental responsibilities); Windham v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 710, 718 (Neb. 2016) (allowing relative to care for child for "significant period of time is not the equivalent of forfeiting parental
preference" because parent's recognition of her own temporary inability may be evidence of
adequate parenting).
318. T.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family Sers., 979 So.2d 1075, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008); Adoption of Isabelle T., 175 A.3d 639, 649 (Me. 2017); Matter of Adoption of Joseph
LL, 473 N.E.2d 736, 736-37 (N.Y. 1984).
319. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A) (West 2015) (italics added); see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.032(1) (West 2014) (court shall infer intent to abandon if a parent "makes little or
no provision for the child's support or makes little or no effort to communicate with the child"
and may infer intent if a parent makes "only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled
purpose to assume all parental duties").
320. In re Adoption of C.N.A., 108 N.E.3d 553, 557-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018); In re D.T.,
292 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Colo. App. 2012) (interpreting de facto custody statute applying to child
not in parent's "physical care").
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circumstances excuse periods of de minimis contact.3 2 1 IS minimal contact excused when a parent was deployed in the military, thwarted by
the custodial parent, struggles with drug addiction, or recuperates
from serious illness? In these scenarios, courts typically hold the child
is not abandoned.3 2 2 Yet, each scenario has also given rise to a de facto
parent case.3 23 Because de facto parenthood applies to the same cases
as entrustment and abandonment, it enables courts to bypass the welltraversed limits on adoption on an ad hoc basis. 3 2 4
B. De Facto Parenthood'sDistinctive Cases
Given this vast overlap, does de facto parenthood have a distinctive
niche where it the primary legal norm? De facto parenthood is the only
option for petitioners who want to claim parental rights by virtue of
living with and performing childcare alongside the fit legal parent.
1.

Caregivingby Former Cohabitants and Stepparents

A and B are the legal parents of a child. A starts a relationship with
C, who later moves in and provides substantial caretaking assistance
for the child. After multiple years, A and C split. C may assert de facto
parent status againstA or B or both.
The first fact-pattern involves the married or unmarried stepparents of the custodial parent who use de facto parenthood to seek visitation or custody against the objection of their former partner or the

321. E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 765 (Ind. 2018) (mother's failure to communicate for
one year excused because she was making a good faith effort at recovery from drug abuse
and the father and stepmother thwarted her efforts at communication); Rodgers v. Rodgers,
519 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Ark. 2017) (court order denying mother visitation due to drug use did
not excuse her failure to communicate with the children in other ways).
322. In re Madeline S., 769 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (discussing scenarios).
323. See, e.g., supra note 318; Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 173 (Mass. 1999)
(father is largely absent from child's life while deployed overseas and child lives with mother
and aunt; mother dies when child is five and father continues to acquiesce to aunt's caretaking for four more years); McDonelv. Sohn, 762 A.2d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Randy
A.J. v. Norma I.J., 655 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Moran v. Weldon, 57 P.3d 898,
901 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); In re Visitation & Custody of Senturi N.S.V., 652 S.E.2d 490, 500
(W. Va. 2007) (overturning trial and appellate courts' approval of shared custody to paternal
grandparents with whom biological mother allowed overnight stays); Matter of Holt, 420
P.3d 676, 680-81 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (recounting attempts to determine whether "residing in
the same household . .. on a day-to-day basis" is satisfied by weekends, three nights, or five
nights each week).
324. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Victoria R., 201 P.3d 169, 175 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009)
(using psychological parentage when mother left child with petitioners telling them she did
not intend to return); Matter of Holt, 420 P.3d at 681 (describing attempts by courts of appeals to determine how many overnights each week is sufficient to establish residency with
the grandparents).

952

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:909

non-custodial parent.3 25 In Moreau v. Sylvester, for example, the legal
mother Sylvester had an "on-again-off-again relationship for eight to
ten years" with Moreau, during which he played a "significant, fatherfigure role" in the lives of her two children.3 2 6 After they stopped dating, they continued to share responsibility for several years until their
relationship deteriorated.3 27 Moreau engaged in threatening behavior
and received a relief from abuse order, at about the same time he filed
a parentage complaint seeking custody.3 2 8 The Vermont Supreme
Court recognized Moreau might qualify as a parent under a de facto
parenthood doctrine and declined to adopt it, in part out of concern
cohabitants could use the doctrine for harassment.3 2 9
Sometimes disputes arise between the cohabitant of a custodial parent and the noncustodial parent, such as in Harrington v. Daum.3 0
Daum and his wife had two children before their divorce, during which
she received custody and he substantial visitation.33 1 A month after the
divorce, she met Harrington and began staying at his home on weekends with the children.33 2 Harrington often performed parental tasks,
such as picking the children up from daycare.333 When the mother died
a year later, Daum received custody.33 4 He allowed Harrington to see
the children several times, but then decided Harrington was interfering with his role as a father and limited his contact.335 Harrington
sought visitation as a de facto parent.33 6 The trial court concluded Harrington had a parent-child relationship and awarded him visitation
under a best interest test, but was reversed by the court of appeals.33 7
If former stepparents or cohabitants are going to obtain custody or
visitation in these circumstances, then it will have to come via de facto
parenthood. There were no allegations Sylvester or Daum were unfit
or abandoned their children. Some states allow former stepparents or
cohabitants to seek visitation as persons in loco parentis, but even if
Moreau or Harrington had third-party standing, they could not have

325. See Kinnard v. Kinnard, 43 P.3d 150, 154 (Alaska 2002) (former stepmother);
Thorndike v. Lisio, 154 A.3d 624, 628 (Me. 2017) (former stepfather); cf. Janet Mary Riley,
Stepparents'Responsibilityof Support, 44 LA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1984).
326. 95 A.3d 416, 417-18 (Vt. 2014).
327. Id. at 418.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 424.
330. 18 P.3d 456 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
331. Id. at 456-57.
332. Id. at 457.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 458.
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overcome the parental presumption. Sylvester and Daum voluntarily
sustained their children's relationship with a former stepparent because they needed help or believed it benefited the children. While
these two stepfathers were ultimately unsuccessful, this is one place
where de facto parenthood makes a distinctive contribution that does
not overlap or soften formal rules. De facto parenthood can decisively
alter the relationship between a child and her parents' spouses or cohabitants who takes on parental responsibilities alongside the legal
parent.
2. ParentsLiving with Relatives who Assist with Childcare
The second distinctive fact pattern involves relatives who live with
a parent and her children and assist with childcare. A typical example
is D.G. v. D.B, in which a grandmother sought to share custody of her
grandchild with her daughter.33 8 Facing financial hardship due in part
to drug addiction, D.B. and her child lived sporadically with the grandmother.33 9 The grandmother "played a large role in [the child's] life,
providing occasional shelter, meals, laundry, and transportation to
and from medical appointments."3 4 0 Although nothing suggested the
mother intended her child to live permanently with the grandmother
and it had been four years since they last lived with her, the trial court
found the grandmother could seek visitation as a de facto parent.3 4 1
Like stepparents, relatives who live with and care for a child can
petition for third-party visitation under modern in loco parentis law,
but they are unlikely to overcome the parental presumption. De facto
parenthood fundamentally changes the posture of these cases. Although some scholars contend functional parentage advocacy slights
relative caretakers,3 4 2 the de facto parent doctrine is not limited by its
terms to people who understand themselves as "parents," as opposed
to nonparent caretakers with full parental responsibilities. In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K. and the UPA (2017) only require a relationship
that is "parental in nature."3 43 Neither define this term, but it is broad
enough to encompass relatives who act as parents, even if they are not

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
ACT

D.G. v. D.B., 91 A.3d 706, 708 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2014).
Id. at 711-12.
Id. at 711.
Id.
Coupet, supra note 245, at 639-41.
In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis.

§ 609(d)(5)

(UNIF.

LAW

COMM'N

2017);

RESTATEMENT

1995); UNIF. PARENTAGE
OF

CHILDREN

AND

THE

LAW § 1.82(a)(3), cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (noting Restatement
intended to encompass relative caregivers who might be excluded by UPA's "holding out"
element).
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"parents" in a more typical sense.344 Similar de facto parenthood doc-

trines have been used to give custody to relative caretakers.3 45
Under non-discriminatory parentage and adoption law, de facto
parenthood is unnecessary in most cases where custody or visitation
is appropriate. When parents enter preconception agreements or when
a parent abandons a child, other doctrines exist to protect caretakers.
The rules of these existing doctrines, however, are threatened by de
facto parenthood's broad parentage standard. I do not contend existing
law is ideal, but existing rules developed to accommodate parental
rights and child welfare in common fact patterns. Before we give
judges discretion to avoid these policy settlements on an ad hoc basis,
we should argue about whether the policies justify revising the rules.
The problems are worse in the last two types of cases. De facto
parenthood's distinctive conceptual niche, where it is revolutionary, is
to treat former partners or relative caretakers as legal parents. In
these cases, de facto parenthood raises serious constitutional problems
because these petitioners would otherwise have to overcome Troxel's
parental presumption.
IV.

CAN DE FACTO PARENTHOOD BE CONSTITUTIONAL?

Courts and scholars appeal to three arguments to reconcile strong
de facto parenthood with the constitutional rights of the legal parent:
(1) the de facto parent is a legal parent under state law, so Troxel does
not apply; (2) the legal parent consented to de facto parenthood; and
(3) children suffer when they lose a relationship with a de facto parent.3 4 6 None of these arguments justifies a de facto parent doctrine that
elevates stepparent or relative caregivers to parental status. They appear persuasive only because courts still treat preconception agreements as the paradigm and, consequently, fail to confront the constitutional problem.
344. RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82, Reporter's Note, cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (describing precedent for applying de facto parenthood to
relative caregivers).
345. W.H. v. D.W., 78 A3d 327, 331-42 (D.C. 2013) (Two young children lived with their
mother and eighteen-year-old half-brother. Their father had little involvement except paying
child support. Because their mother was seriously ill, the half-brother performed most of the
childcare with assistance from his grandmother. When their mother died, the court awarded
the half-brother custody over the children, denying custody to the father and grandmother.).
See Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Breaking the Mold and Picking Up the Pieces: Rights
of Parenthoodand Parentagein NontraditionalFamilies, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 104, 107 (2013).
346. Some courts also argue the legal parent acted "contrary to the child-parent relationship," but the two ways parents act contrary to the relationship is by consenting to another
parent, Kulstadv. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 604, 607 (Mont. 2009) (preadoption consent); In re
L.F.A., 220 P.3d 391, 395 (Mont. 2009) (preconception consent), or by voluntarily failing to
perform parental roles. In re AP.P., 251 P.3d 127, 129 (Mont. 2011) (noncustodial father
missed "many visitation opportunities" and paid only 30% of child support). See also Estroff
v. Chatterjee, 660 S.E.2d 73, 82 (N.C. 2008) (similar).
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State Power to Define Parentage

Many courts and scholars think de facto parenthood can be distinguished from Troxel in a way that "bypass[es] the constitutional problem altogether."3 47 Troxel held that states must give "special weight"
to parents' judgment about visitation with third parties, such as
grandparents.3 4 8 De facto parents are not third parties. They are legal
parents on par with parents by biology or adoption.3 4 9 State law answers the prior "threshold question" of "who qualifies as a 'parent' with
coequal rights" before any constitutional parental presumptions apply.35 0 As the Washington Supreme Court asserts, "Troxel does not . .
place any constitutional limitations on the ability of states to legislatively, or through their common law, define a parent or family." 35 1
1.

Limits on State Discretion to Define Parentage

In its boldest version, this argument assumes that state law determines who is a "parent" for constitutional law purposes with no constitutional oversight. This is a clear exaggeration. States generally define parents, but state parentage law is circumscribed by constitutional parental rights. 3 5 2 Parental rights are not unique in this regard.
As Dean David Meyer has explained, the Constitution protects other
liberties specified by state law. 35 3 The Constitution forbids states from
depriving persons of property without due process and just compensation, yet state law defines property interests. 35 4 Individuals also have
a constitutional right to marry, yet marriage is a status created by
state law. 35 5

347. Grossman, supra note 26, at 336-37; see also Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del.
2011); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 178 (Wash. 2005); Bowman, supra note 135, at
150; Maldonado, supra note 109, at 896; Courtney G. Joslin, De Facto Parentage and the
Modern Family, 40 FAM. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2018); Polikoff, supra note 198, at 219 (only with
respect to intentional parenthood). But see Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet
Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a DifferentiatedModel of Functional
Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 456-61, 468-70 (2013) (arguing functional parents
should not be treated as formal parents entitled to the constitutional presumption).
348. 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000).
349. Smith, 16 A.3d at 931.
350. Id. See also In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 499 (N.Y. 2016);
Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A3d 416, 443 (Vt. 2014) (Robinson, J., dissenting).
351. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 178. Contra In re Nelson, 825 A.2d 501, 504
(2003); Guardianship of K.N., 73 N.E.3d 271, 275 (Mass. 2017).
352. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), 256-57; Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional
Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1499 (2018).
353. David Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY 47, 57-62 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
354. Id. at 57.
355. Obergefellv. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
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Property law scholars have explored the dynamic in such hybrid
constitutional and state law rights.35 6 On the one hand, deferring to a
state's definitions of property limits interference with welfare regulations, encourages innovation and democracy, and limits the uncertainty and cost of federal litigation.3 5 7 It also allows states to identify
novel property interests that merit constitutional protection.35 8 On the
other hand, without a federal definition of property, states may unduly
contract or expand constitutional protections.35 9 States could avoid
providing due process or compensation by declaring an interest is not
"property"; or, states could interfere with regulation or established
property rights by deeming a novel interest "property."3 60 Thus, although state law creates the property interests that receive Constitutional protection, the takings and due process clauses also constrain
state power to define property, fixing a floor to specify the minimal
content of property and a ceiling to limit the expansion of protected
interests.3 6 1
Something similar is true of parentage. Although state law defines
parents, the Constitutional rights of parents constrain state power to
define parents in two ways: states must recognize certain individuals
as parents, and states may recognize new classes of parents only if
consistent with established parental rights. The remainder of this section describes the required classes of parents, while the next section
describes some limits on adding parents.
Constitutional law sets a floor by requiring states to recognize certain classes of individuals as legal parents.3 6 2 The precise contours of
constitutional parentage are uncertain, but three classes of adults
have claims to constitutional parental rights independent of state law:
genetic fathers, birth mothers, and genetic mothers.
Only the first is firmly established in existing Supreme Court precedent. The Court's only substantial discussions of constitutional par-

356. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L.
REV. 885 (2000); Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What The Many Factorsof Murr v.
Wisconsin Mean For PropertyFederalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 59-63 (2017).
357. Brady, supra note 356, at 63.
358. Maureen E. Brady, Property's Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of Takings
Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1208-09 (2016).
359. Merrill, supra note 356, at 923.
360. Brady, supra note 356, at 59, 62-63.
361. Id. at 65-66. But see Brady, supra note 358, at 1218-23 (casting doubt on value of a
federal definition).
362. See Higdon, supra note 352, at 1495-1502, 1524-25 (describing constitutional limits
on state efforts to define nonmarital fatherhood).
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entage occur in its unmarried father cases, where the Justices developed what is now known as the "biology plus" test.3 6 3 States must recognize the legal paternity of a genetic father who has fulfilled parental
roles, at least as long as there is no competing paternity presumption. 3 6 4 In addition, genetic fathers must have some opportunity to
adopt the caretaking roles that will ground full constitutional parental
rights. 3 65
This Constitutional definition of fatherhood limits state power to
define legal paternity, as the Court explained in Stanley v. Illinois. 366
Stanley lived with his three genetic children and their mother, yet
when she passed away, Illinois automatically removed his children. 367
Illinois argued Stanley had no parental liberty interest under the
Constitution, because state law defined a man as a legal father only if
he married the child's mother. 368 The Court rejected this argument. A
state cannot simply define paternity to exclude unmarried genetic fathers because the Constitution "necessarily limits the authority of a
State to draw such 'legal' lines as they choose." 369
Unlike paternity, the Supreme Court has never addressed the factual ground for mothers' constitutional rights. Nevertheless, simple
extensions of the biology plus test can support tentative conclusions.
A woman who gives birth to her own genetic child has full parental
rights at birth, because she accepts a measure of responsibility by performing the work of pregnancy and childbirth. 37 0 This argument coheres with the Court's reasoning in the equal protection cases where
it has allowed the law to treat birth mothers and fathers differently.3 7 1
363. Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathersand Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Context, 72 TEx. L. REV. 967, 971-78 (1994).
364. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); Michael H. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110,
128-29 (1989). Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. suggests states may define
parentage however they prefer, id. at 130, and, moreover, that any laws that follow traditional conceptions of parenthood are beyond challenge, id. at 126-27. However, Scalia relies
on his controversial historical method for defining unenumerated rights, and contrary to his
plurality opinion, five justices assumed that biological fathers have a parental liberty with
respect to a child conceived in an adulterous affair, irrespective of state law or history. Id. at
136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
365. Mark Strasser, The Often Illusory Protections of "Biology Plus:" on the Supreme
Court'sParentalRights Jurisprudence, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 31, 67-78 (2007) (surveying
state court interpretations of the constitutional "opportunity," finding little actual protection
for unmarried genetic fathers).
366. 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). See also Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256-57.
367. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646-47.
368. Id. at 650.
369. Id. at 652 (quotation omitted). The Court writes that the "Equal Protection Clause"
limits state authority in this regard, but the reference is to equal treatment of a fundamental
right rather than to sex discrimination.
370. Kathy Baker, The DNA Default and its Discontents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2037, 2057-61
(2016); Higdon, supra note 352, at 1535.
371. Baker, supranote 370, at 2059-61.
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Sometimes the Justices suggests pregnant women form emotional
bonds with the fetus in utero, which comes perilously close to gender
stereotyping, but other times the Court recognizes that pregnancy and
childbirth are work that can justify additional rights.3 7 2 In addition to
traditional mothers, genetic mothers who are not gestational mothers
should receive constitutional protection. If the biology plus test applies
in a gender-neutral fashion, then states must define legal maternity
to include genetic mothers who fulfil parental responsibilities for their
children after the birth.3 7 3
Outside these cases, it is difficult to predict who else, if anyone, has
Constitutional parental rights because the Court has never addressed
cases of pure intentional or functional parents without a genetic connection.3 7 4 Suppose a woman and her partner decide to have a child
together, so she undergoes IVF using anonymous egg and sperm donors. If their relationship ends during the pregnancy, must state law
afford her partner an opportunity to develop a parental relationship?
Suppose a woman agrees to be a gestational surrogate for two intended
parents, again using anonymous gamete donors. If the surrogate later
changes her mind and wants to keep the child, who has parental
rights? There are few legal or moral signposts in this novel territory.
So far, courts have allowed legal, social, and moral norms to develop
without federal constitutional constraint. States are developing legal
regimes for assisted reproductive technology, including preconception
agreements, surrogacy agreements, and voluntary acknowledgements
of parentage.
2. Limits on State Discretion to Add New Kinds of Parents
Few people suggest that assisted reproduction statutes raise deep
constitutional problems. Does this suggest that as long as states maintain the required classes of constitutional parents, they may add new
types of parents without constitutional oversight? This might suggest
a narrowed state power argument: states may not constrict the core
categories of parentage but may expand parentage without implicating constitutional rights. Can de facto parenthood be justified by
states' plenary authority to add new classes of parents?
Even this narrower vision of state discretion is too strong. Two hypothetical examples can illustrate why states lack plenary power to
create new classes of parents. Imagine a state statute that provides
genetic grandparents are presumed parents. This statute answers the
threshold question of who a legal parent is, yet surely it limits the constitutional rights of birth mothers and fathers. It would be incredible
372. Id. at 2060-61.
373. Higdon, supra note 352, at 1535-36.
374. Id. at 1510-14 (describing state law approaches to gestational surrogacy).
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to suggest Washington could award the Troxels visitation without violating Granville's rights if only its statute labels grandparents as
"parents." An ipse dixit of state law cannot turn grandparents into parents. Although Troxel was a case between a parent and grandparent,
it does limit state power to define a parent.
Other, more realistic parentage reforms raise more difficult issues.
Imagine a statute providing cohabitants of birth mothers are presumed legal parents. Perhaps legislators wanted to treat married and
unmarried couples equally. Under current law, spouses are presumed
parents at birth, but cohabitants remain in limbo until they satisfy the
two-year residence requirement, during which time their partner controls their ability to become parents.3 7 5 This cohabitant presumption,
like the grandparent presumption, limits the constitutional rights of
birth mothers. Whether this limit is constitutional depends on whether
its justification is consistent with the mother's parental rights. The
argument for treating spouses and cohabitants equally assumes that
the rationale for the marital presumption applies equally to cohabitants. Most mothers intend for their spouses to be a coparent, and most
spouses demonstrate commitment to the child by assisting with the
pregnancy, birth, and infant care. Is that equally true of cohabitants?
These hypothetical laws illustrate two things: adding a new category of parents can limit the rights of recognized constitutional parents, and whether adding a new category is constitutional depends on
whether its rationale is consistent with the right of existing parents.
De facto parentage cannot be justified by a bald appeal to state power.
Persuasive definition cannot bypass this constitutional difficulty. Advocates of de facto parenthood must show it falls within the range of
state discretion bounded by the rights of established constitutional
parents.
3.

De Facto Parentsjust are ConstitutionalParents

Courts and scholars might have a different argument in mind when
they say de facto parents are parents not third parties. They might
believe de facto parent tests recognize caregivers who are already constitutional parents. Why would de facto parents be constitutional parents? This could be an interpretive claim: existing constitutional precedents justify recognizing de facto parents have a liberty interest in
the relationship. Or it could be a natural rights claim: de facto parents
have a moral right to sustain a relationship with their children. If either proposition is true, then it is not state law that elevates de facto
parents to the status of constitutional parents. Functional parents

375.

UNIF.PARENTAGE ACT

§ 204(a)(1),

(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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have constitutional parental rights, and de facto parenthood merely
recognizes and protects those constitutional rights.
Indeed, these arguments entail a stronger conclusion: if de facto
parents have Constitutional parental rights, then states must adopt
strong de facto parentage. This hefty implication is a reason for skepticism. Nevertheless, I cannot rule it out within the scope of this Article. Evaluating these arguments would require complete theories of
constitutional and moral parentage.3 7 6 That said, I have not seen
courts or advocates make these arguments either. The argumentative
burden should fall on advocates who seek to limit the rights of adults
with well-established constitutional parental rights, whether by biology, presumptions, agreements, or adoption. In what follows, I assume
that elevating a third party to parental status limits the constitutional
rights of existing parents. Sections B and C consider two arguments
intended to demonstrate that states have sufficient reason to recognize
de facto parentage even though it limits the rights of existing parents.
B.

Consent to a New Parent-like Relationship

When courts and scholars admit that de facto parenthood restricts
the rights of an existing parent, the courts typically respond that they
may limit her rights because she "consented to, and fostered, the . .
parent-like relationship."3 7 7 The Washington Supreme Court argued,
Once a petitioner has made the threshold showing that
the natural or legal parent consented to and fostered
the parent-like relationship, the State is no longer interfering on behalf of a third party in an insular family
unit but is enforcing the rights and obligations of
parenthood that attach to de facto parents.3 7 8
Other courts argue the legal parent waived her right to exclusive
custody by consenting to a de facto parent relationship.3 7 9 A similar
argument appears in the commentary to the Restatement. 38 0
376. The nonmarital fathers sketch vague contours for constitutional parentage but their
underlying conception of parentage remains unclear, Higdon, supra note 352, at 1501-02,
and in any case, does not suggest functional parentage is sufficient to confer constitutional
status. Id. at 1534-35.
377. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551, 553-54 (N.J. 2000). ContraIn re B.B.O., 277 P.3d
818, 823 (Colo. 2012) (finding parental consent is not required to respect parent's constitutional rights).
378. In re Custody of B.M.H. 315 P.3d 470, 478 (Wash. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). See also A.A. v. B.B., 384 P.3d 878, 891 (Haw. 2016) ("because [the legal parent] permitted [the de facto parent] to share physical custody of Child in addition to the parenting
responsibilities and duties with regard to Child, [the legal parent] does not have a protected
privacy interest in excluding [the de facto parent] from Child' s life").
379. E.g., V C., 748 A.2d at 553-54.
380. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
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Consent is a notoriously slippery concept. To evaluate this argument, we need to know more about the nature of consent and how
courts use consent in de facto parent cases. 3 8 1 In this section, I argue
consent may justify de facto parenthood in agreement cases, but legal
parents rarely consent to stepparent or relative caregiving in a way
that could justify elevating these nonparents to parental status.
1.

The nature of consent in general

As Professor Heidi Hurd nicely phrased it, consent is "moral
magic."3 8 2 Consent transforms the moral universe, converting "a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; [and] a theft into
a gift."3 83 Consent works by rearranging moral relations. By entering
the ring, a boxer turns her opponents' duty not to touch her into a privilege to punch her.3 8 4 Do legal parents consent to de facto parenthood
in a way that gives the state permission to create new parental rights?
Evaluating consent arguments requires wrestling with four interrelated questions. First, how does a parent consent? One might consent by forming a mental state, uttering an expression, or performing
an act. Second, to what must a parent consent? One always consents
to something, the object of consent. Legal parents might consent to
caretaking, attachments, a relationship, or a legal parent. Third, how
does the law fix the object of consent? One must interpret the relevant
mental state, expressions, or acts to determine what he consented to.
Finally, answers to the first three questions should be tailored to the
fourth: why does consent alter rights? A legal parent's consent to a
particular object must justify extending parental rights to this third
party.
The first question, the nature of consent, is particularly illuminating for de facto parenthood. Legal philosophers distinguish three possibilities. Consent might be (1) a subjective mental state of willingness,
(2) a communication that expresses willingness, or (3) a performative
act designated by social norms as changing moral relations.38 5 I will be
agnostic about which is the best theory of consent, but the advocates
of de facto parenthood who appeal to consent must use some viable
theory. Is one in the offing?

381. See Parness, supra note 215, at 400 (discussing the ways courts use consent in de
facto parent cases).
382. Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 144 (1996).
383. Id. at 123.
384. Heidi Hurd, The Normative Force of Consent, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON THE
ETHICS OF CONSENT, § 4.2.1 (Peter Schaber & Andreas Muller eds., 2018).
385. Larry Alexander, The Ontology of Consent, 55 ANALYTIC PHIL. 102, 102 (2014).

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

962

2.

[Vol. 46:909

Consent as a performative act that transfersparentalrights

The law often conceives of consent as a performative. A performative is a speech act that changes moral, legal, or conventional relations. 3 86 The act itself can be a verbal expression or an action endowed
by convention with expressive meaning.3 87 Classic examples include
exchanging marital vows, issuing commands, or christening ships.3 8 8
Because performatives rely on conventional meaning, the law can
designate which public act or expression is sufficient "consent" to alter
legal relations.3 89 This allows the law to limit disputes about whether,
when, and how consent alters rights. For this reason, the performative
theory resonates with the objective theory of contract.3 90 The acts need
to be salient yet somewhat arbitrary. The public must recognize the
acts as altering rights, yet the acts also need to be unusual enough
that people do not perform them with no intention of changing rights.
Contracting parties used to affix a seal to a document; now they check
a box on an electronic form. Fianc6s used to jump over a broom; now
they exchange vows. Performative theory also allows the law to efficiently resolve the object of consent. Just as the law can declare which
acts count, it also can declare how to interpret the legal effect of those
acts. Parties who exchange promises generate legal duties that follow
their conventional meaning, yet couples who exchange promises in
marriage ceremonies create only the default marital obligations.
One might think of adoption and parenting agreements as speech
acts by which one legal parent creates a new legal parent. The law
empowers a legal parent to share parental custody rights with a third
party, specifies the acts the parent must perform to exercise her power,
and sets conditions for the exercise of that power. In adoption, all the
existing parents must declare their consent in court (or in writing) and
obtain judicial approval.3 91 States could liberalize adoption law by removing the formal conditions. That is arguably what the court did in
Kilbornby recognizing the legal parents had an elaborate "sprouts and

386. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 66 (2016); see also N.C. Manson, Permissive
Consent: a robust reason-changingaccount, 173 PHILOSOPHICAL STUD. 3317, 3318 (2016) (defining consent as a behavioral act directed at others with the intent to change their reasons).
387. John Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 11-12 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010).
388. J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 64 (J. 0. Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds., 1975).
389. The acts must occur against the right normative background conditions. See
Kleinig, supra note 387, at 11-20; Govert Den Hartogh, Can Consent be Presumed?, 28 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 295, 301 (2011).
390. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLuMBIAL. REV. 269, 304-06 (1986).
391. See JASPER, supranotes 235, 239-42. Some might argue the adoption or agreement
is just evidence of the parents' subjective asset to create a new parent. In that case, the
burden of the argument shifts to subsection IV.B.3 below.
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roots" ceremony.3 9 2 Preconception agreements perform a similar function for prospective parents and surrogates. By signing a parentage
agreement, the biological parent creates a new nonbiological legal parent.3 93 Some courts call these parenting "contracts," but this is not a
contract in the sense of an exchange of promises of performance with
the intent to be bound.3 9 4 Rather, the agreement declares someone with
no biological relationship to the child is a legal parent.3 95
Performative consent is sufficient to protect the rights of the existing parent. When a legal parent performs a formal adoption or parentage agreement, she is exercising her power to create rights for the new
parent. It is nearly nonsensical for her to claim later that treating this
person as a legal parent violates her constitutional rights.3 96 In this set
of cases, it is accurate to say that the legal parent exercised her parental autonomy to create a new legal parent.3 97 I suspect one reason
courts accept the consent justification is that most of the seminal cases
involve oral or written preconception agreements.3 9 8 Indeed, the recent
New York and Vermont cases carefully limit their consent holdings to
parentage agreements.3 99 The Supreme Court of Kansas has been particularly clear in demanding the legal parent "knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive their parental preference by entering a custody
agreement with a third party." 4 00
Unfortunately, most courts have been more freewheeling. After
they note that the legal mother agreed to recognize the second legal
parent, they continue on to describe how she also allowed her partner
to fulfill parental roles and develop parental bonds. 4 0 1 If consent is a
performative, these latter comments are unnecessary. Insofar as they
392. "Equitable adoption" sometimes allows courts to forgive formal defects when parties
perform an act equivalent to judicial adoption, while in other cases it treats subjective intent
to adopt as sufficient in the absence of any performative act or similar equivalent.
393. In re T.P.S., 978 N.E.2d 1070, 1084 (111. App. Ct. 2012); Frazierv. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d
542, 556-57 (Kan. 2013); In re Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth AC.C., 61 N.E.3d. 488, 500 (N.Y. 2016).
394. See Eldredge v. Taylor, 339 P.3d 888, 893 (Okla. 2014); Frazier, 295 P.3d at 555-58.
395. Ohio will not allow a shared parenting agreement because the legislature has the
power to define parentage, but a parent may relinquish some of her exclusive rights via contract, conditioned on a judicial determination that sharing custody is in the child' s best interests. In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 248 (Ohio 2002).
396. She could argue, implausibly but coherently, that the constitutional right to parent
is not alienable by the parent, so states cannot give parents the legal power to transfer their
parental rights voluntarily, so her attempt to do so was ultra vires.
397. Frazier, 295 P.3d at 557 (2013).
398. See, e.g., In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 436, n. 40 (Wis. 1995).
399. E.g., Sinnott v. Peck, 180 A.3d 560, 572 (Vt. 2017).
400. Frazier, 295 P.3d at 556; Matter of Adoption of T.M.M.H., 416 P.3d 999, 1009 (Kan.
2018) (plurality).
401. E.g., T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A2d 913, 919 (Pa. 2001) ("The record is clear that Appellant
consented to Appellee's performance of parental duties. She encouraged Appellee to assume
the status of a parent and acquiesced as Appellee carried out the day-to-day care of A.M.");
H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 436, n. 40.
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suggest that what matters is whether the legal parent acquiesces to
caretaking, they invoke a different and wider sense of consent. The
notion of consent as acquiescence is necessary to open the door to stepparent or relative caretakers because in these cases, the legal parent
rarely performs any acts that could be conventionally understood as
transferring parental rights.
One might object that I underestimate the conventional nature of
speech acts. Law can create new conventions. Perhaps by enacting de
facto parenthood, a state declares that allowing someone to reside with
and care for a child henceforth counts as consent to parental rights. 4 0 2
One problem with this response is that these are not felicitous
speech acts. Allowing someone to develop a relationship is not a determinate act that could mark the moment when rights transfer. This
practical problem can be addressed, however. States may move to a
formal rule, such as co-residence for a fixed period. A more intractable
problem is that co-residence is not arbitrary enough. The act must be
relatively arbitrary, so it can develop a public meaning as a rightstriggering event, as distinct from a common act done for other reasons. 4 03 A legal parent has many reasons to cohabit and share caretaking that have nothing to do with changing legal rights.
In any case, this hypothetical argument is insincere, in a sense. The
justifications for de facto parenthood conflict with the justifications for
treating consent as a speech act. Performative consent protects autonomy, because an agent can use the convention to control her rights,
and others can interact with the agent based on the conventional understanding. 404 Giving agents a means to define their rights prospectively
also enables them to coordinate efficiently. The goal of de facto
parenthood is not to give parents control over when their children obtain
new legal parents, either to protect parental liberty or encourage efficient parenting. Advocates want parental status to be determined retroactively according to past caretaking. One cannot retroactively reinterpret past conduct as a non-existent performative. What advocates
really seem to believe is that parents lose their right to exclude third
parties when they allow them to share parenting. This is a claim of
waiver, which brings us to the next sense of consent.
3.

Consent as subjective assent waiving a right to exclude

The New Jersey Supreme Court expounded a consent argument in
the most detail. It argues de facto parenthood does not infringe the
legal parent's rights because

402.
403.
404.

Thanks to Sean Williams for pressing this objection.
Manson, supra note 386, at 3328.
Barnett, supra note 390, at 310-11.

2019] WHAT ROLE REMAINS FOR DE FACTO PARENTHOOD?

[w]hat we have addressed here is . .

965

the volitional choice of a legal

parent to cede a measure of parental authority to a third party; to
allow that party to function as a parent in the day-to-day life of the
child; and to foster the forging of a parental bond between the third
party and the child.4 05

This passage equates consent with choice, one of a variety of subjective theories of consent. 4 06 Subjective consent might be a mental
state, such as desire, willingness, or acquiescence, or a mental act,
such as intending, willing, or choosing. 407
Subjective consent is central to moral autonomy. 408 Consider how consent functions in a property rights context, as illustrated by Professor
Kim Ferzan. 4 09 Suppose I see you out my window about to cross my
lawn to reach the beach. I do not mind. I want to shout, "It's ok," but
you cannot hear. If you cross, you act culpably by not ensuring that I
did not mind, but you have not violated my property rights. My assent
extended you a privilege. 4 10 Some theorists think we have a right to our
body, labor, or property only if we have a moral power to grant or withhold
such assent.4 11
If a parent is willing to allow the state to recognize another adult
as a parent, then no constitutional problems arise. Some ostensibly de
facto parent cases involve consent in this subjective assent sense. A
biological mother who planned in vitro fertilization with her partner
likely wanted her partner to have parental rights. 4 12 This is a waiver
in the classic sense of a "voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment of a known right." 4 13 Yet, consent in this sense will not justify most cases involving stepparent or relative caregivers. The problem with subjective assent is not, as it was with performative consent,
that these legal parents never consented. These parents did assent.
The problem is with the object of their consent. To what do they assent?
Unlike performative consent, for subjective consent the object of
consent is fixed by the object of the agent's intentional mental state. 4 14
She is the master of her consent. Her mental state may be difficult to
405. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553-54 (N.J. 2000).
406. See also Linda D. Elrod, A Child's Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for
Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J. PUB. L. 245, 264-65 (2011).
407. Alexander, supra note 385, at 104; Hurd, supra note 382, at 125.
408. Hurd, supra note 382, at 124; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and
the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405 (2016).
409. Ferzan, supra note 408, at 405.
410. See also Hurd, supra note 384, at § 4.2.2.4.
411. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL
THEORY 187-89 (1982).
412. E.g., Kulstadv. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 606 (Mont. 2006).
413. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 578 (Ky. 2010) (quotation omitted).
414. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 382, at 125.

966

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:909

discern, but it is a matter of fact. For stepparent or relative caregivers,
the parent's intent is rarely in dispute. The parent was willing to allow
the nonparent to perform caretaking functions, exercise caretaking authority, and bond emotionally with her child. 4 15 She did not intend to
create a coequal parent. Assent to parental functions is not the same
as assent to parenthood.
Courts and scholars consistently equivocate on this point. Judicial
rhetoric conjoins the choice to perform parental functions with a choice
to transfer rights. For example, in a widely cited passage, the New
Jersey Supreme court argues
The requirement of cooperation by the legal parent is critical because it places control within his or her hands.... [I]f she wishes to
maintain that zone of privacy she cannot invite a third party to function as a parent to her child and cannot cede over to that third party
parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond
with the child.4 16

This passage equates willingness to share parental responsibilities
or authority with assent to parentage. The ALI Principles make a similar mistake. De facto parenthood requires "agreement of a parent to
the de facto parent relationship," but an agreement exists when "affirmative act or acts by the legal parent demonstrat[e] a willingness
and an expectation of shared parental responsibilities."41 7 The UPA
(2017) completes this conflation by abandoning consent as an express
element. The parent need only "fosterH or supportH the bonded and
dependent relationship" that is "parental in nature." 4 1 8 The assumption is that one cannot foster a relationship without consenting to it.
Nancy Polikoff, an early advocate of de facto parentage, was careful
to avoid this equivocation. She argues, "[b]ecause parental autonomy
would be eviscerated unless . . . the legal parent consents to or cooperates in the formation of an explicit parent-child relationship . . . , the

legal parent also should consider the other adult to be a parent." 4 1 9 It
is not enough that the legal parent sought assistance; she must have
the "intent to create third-party parent status" 4 2 0 or "explicitly ... parental relationships." 4 2 1 Some courts heed Polikoffs distinction. The
Maine Supreme Court emphasized the "distinction, which can be nu-

415. Parness, supra note 215, at 400.
416. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000); see also Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d
443, 447 (Md. 2016).
417. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. (2002)) (emphasis added).
418. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
419. Polikoff, supra note 49, at 490. See also id. at 483 n. 114.
420. Id. at 512.
421. Id. at 516.
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anced and subtle, between the role of a nurturing and involved caregiver and one who acts with and is recognized as being fully equivalent
to a parent." 4 2 2 This Restatement appears to be adopting a similar interpretation of consent. The petitioner must prove the parent "consented to and fostered the formation of a parental bond and dependent
relationship," which the commentary explains occurs "by ceding to the
third party a significant amount of parental responsibility and decisionmaking authority." 423 The Restatement illustrations describe relationships in which the legal parent encourages the de facto parent to
play an equal (or greater) role in the childcare and decisionmaking and
encourages the de facto to be called a "mom."424 These descriptions are
an improvement, but even they remain ambiguous.
Is assent to an explicitly parental relationship the same as assent
to a third-party parent status? Polikoff describes a case in which a
mother tried to avoid the expense of an adoption by giving the child
his stepfather's surname and executing an affidavit saying he was the
child's father. Polikoff concludes this mother "exercised her right to
create a father for her child." 4 25 I worry this example is misleading. The
mother's acts were not successful legal performatives because she did
not follow adoption procedures; nevertheless, she took legalistic actions that revealed she wanted her husband to have a permanent legal
status. In many preconception agreement cases, the parents search for
ways to signal their intent to accept legal parental status. 4 2 6 Do most
parents who live with stepparents or relative caregivers form a similar
intent?
Even for careful writers, the waiver argument conflates assent to
parental caretaking, authority, or attachments with assent to equal
legal parentage. 4 27 Families often fall into parent-like roles out of necessity. Parents trying out new blended families may encourage their
partners to help parent-what else would we expect? A legal parent
422. Davis v. McGuire, 186 A.3d 837, 847 (Me. 2018). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit.
19-A, § 1891(3)(c) (2016) (parent "understood, acknowledged or accepted that or behaved as
though the person is a parent of the child").
423.

RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW

§

1.82 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. Tentative

Draft No. 2, 2019).
424. Id. at § 1.82 cmt. h. The extent of caretaking plays a large role in illustrations 11
and 13, and in addition, the legal parent allowed the third-party to share childrearing decisions rather than refused to share any authority, compare illus. 11, 13 with 12, 15, and encouraged the child to call the third-party some variant of "mom" rather than "auntie." Compare illus. 11, 12, with 14, 15.
425. Polikoff, supra note 49, at 513.
426. E.g., Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 576-77 (Ky. 2010) (seeking agreed
judgment of custody).
427. See Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 169 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("A parent has
the absolute control and ability to maintain a zone of privacy around his or her child. However, a parent cannot maintain an absolute zone of privacy if he or she voluntarily invites a
third party to function as a parent to the child.").
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who assents to caretaking gives another person the liberty to parent.
He waives his claim against interference. He waives the kind of complaint he has against intrusive aunts, teachers, or neighbors who seek
to develop parental bonds with his child. He does not waive his objection to the creation of a permanent new legal parent.4 2 8 Subjective assent to parental roles is fundamentally distinct from subjective assent
to legal parentage, as some courts recognize. 4 2 9
Assent to parental roles does not justify de facto parenthood because such assent is usually revocable. 43 0 Typically, a right-holder has
the power to waive a correlative duty and reinstate it. When I consent
to box, I waive my claim that you not hit me. I exercise my power to
replace your duty not to hit me with a privilege. Yet, I can quit, which
reinstates your duty. If you punch me after I turn my back, you commit
a battery. The same applies to trespass. When I allow you to cross my
land, I exercise my power to replace your duty not to enter with a privilege. Yet, I can kick you out. In both examples, you had a duty to me
and I had a power to turn it into a privilege. I exercised my power
without giving it up. Consequently, I can change your privilege back
into a duty. I could have given up my power over your duty. I could
have promised to sell you an easement, which would deprive me and
subsequent owners of the ability to change your privilege back into a
duty. The easement creates a first-order privilege and a second-order
immunity. Consent to the privilege does not necessarily create any immunity that deprives the agent of his ability to revoke the privilege.
When a legal parent allows someone to care for her child, she gives
him a privilege to parent held by no other adult. The privilege to parent does not necessarily come with an immunity. The legal parent did
not assent to transfer her power to decide who may associate with her
child in the future. 43 1 Moreover, a legal parent can allow someone to
make parental decisions without thereby giving up her power to choose
who will decide in the future. 43 2 The delegation of parental authority
428. Estroff v. Chatterjee, 660 S.E.2d 73, 78 (N.C. App. 2008) (courts must look at both
conduct and subjective intent to determine "whether the legal parent has voluntarily chosen
to create a family unit and to cede to the third party a sufficiently significant amount of
parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent parent-like relationship with his or her child"); Moriggia v. Castelo, 805 S.E.2d 378, 386-87 (N.C. Ct. App.
2017) (intentions during the "formation and pendency" of the relationship).
429. In re N.M.V., 385 P.3d 564, 567 (Mont. 2016) (parent did not cede parenting authority by moving in with boyfriend and allowing him to spend time with the child because they
never intended him to assume equal parenting responsibilities); In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d
302, 307-08 (Ohio 2011) (absent writing, simply fulfilling parental roles is not convincing
evidence about the intent to relinquish custodial rights permanently).
430. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN AND ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 108 (2d ed.)
431. In re N.M.V., 385 P.3d at 567.
432. In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 307-08 (Ohio 2011) (legal parent allowed nonparent
to exercise authority and even named her on power of attorney but refused to sign permanent
waiver of custodial powers).
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does not necessarily come with an immunity. The waiver argument for
de facto parenthood attempts to infer an immunity from the grant of a
privilege or a power, but these are distinct relations that require distinct justifications.
Some courts accept the distinction, such as in Smith v. Jones.4 33
Jones and Smith had lived together for five years when Jones adopted
a child. 43 4 After Jones's family leave ended, Smith cared for the child
during the day until the couple broke up. 435 The courts concluded that
Jones allowed Smith to care for the child but did not intend for Smith
to be a permanent legal parent.43 6 Jones travelled to Russia alone to
select the child from an orphanage without Smith's input. 43 7 The couple had a lawyer, but Jones never pursued joint adoption "because
[she] did not want a permanent co-parenting arrangement." 43 8 Jones
gave the child her surname. 43 9 She named her sister, not Smith, as
guardian in the event of her death. 4 4 0 She made medical decisions
about a major surgery without consulting Smith.4 4 1
Why would adults accept these kinds of relationships? Sometimes,
as in Smith, one person is so committed to becoming a parent that she
is willing to proceed even though her partner is noncommittal. 4 4 2 Often
the legal parent ends up leaning on the cohabitant or relative for caretaking anyway. The parent needs help but does not regard the uncommitted partner as an equal parent. In other cases, a single parent has
an evolving and uncertain relationship with her romantic partner and
wants to keep distance between him and her children. 4 43 Allowing
someone to help care for your child is a privilege that, by default,
should be revocable.
Of course, this does not mean the privilege must be revocable in all
circumstances. The point is that it takes a distinct normative argument to show a privilege should be immune from change. Advocates of
de facto parenthood need a normative argument to justify treating the
legal parent's assent to caretaking, relationships, or authority as an
irrevocable transfer of rights to the nonparent. Consent alone is insufficient. Consent might, however, be a necessary condition.
433. Smith v. Jones, 868 N.E.2d 629, 630 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
434. Id.
435. Id. at 631.
436. Id. at 634.
437. Id. at 630.
438. Id. at 630, 635 n.9.
439. Id. at 635.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. See also J.S. v. M.C., 107 N.E.3d 1118, 2018 WL 3558921, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(unpublished disposition).
443. Brown v. Wyandt, No.8-13-08 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 149, 18-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
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4. Consent as subjective assent with knowledge of detrimental reliance
The law often treats consent as irrevocable to protect reliance interests. If the parent's consent to nonparental caretaking led to detri-

mental reliance, protecting these reliance interests might justify an
immunity for the de facto parent's rights. This argument is most plausible in preconception or preadoption agreement cases, where de facto
parents can rely on principles of promissory estoppel. 4 44 When a legal
mother has agreed to have and raise a child together with her partner,
the legal mother should not be allowed to withdraw her agreement after the partner has relied on it to invest heavily in functional motherhood. These cases, however, can also appeal to consent as a performative. What about the cases without agreements?
Servitudes by estoppel offer another analogy. If I allow someone to
use my land when it is foreseeable she will rely on the privilege in a
substantial way, and she relies on the privilege under a reasonable
belief that I will not revoke it, then I will be estopped from denying her
a servitude insofar as necessary to avoid injustice. 4 45 Could a parallel
argument be made for de facto parenthood in stepparent or relative
caretaker cases?
One argument appeals to reliance by the de facto parent. The legal
parent allowed her to engage in caretaking and to develop parental
bonds with the child. Once the de facto parent invests time and effort
and becomes attached to the child, it is unfair to the de facto parent if
the legal parent may simply cut her out of the child's life. It is hard to
imagine the de facto parent's interests are sufficiently weighty to justify creating a permanent parental relationship. A parent should avoid
causing unnecessary emotional harm to her former partner, but it is
difficult to see why her partner's interests justify visitation orders. The
Massachusetts Supreme Court has expressly denied that de facto parents have a protected liberty interest in the relationship. 44 6 In any case,
this reliance argument is close to circular. 4 47 The law protects reliance
only if it is reasonable. Can a de facto parent reasonably believe she is
entitled to a permanent relationship? This reliance argument assumes
what it seeks to prove.

444.

See supra Section III.A.3; see, e.g., Nguyen v. Boynes, 396 P.3d 774, 778 (Nev. 2017).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.10 (AM. LAW. INST. 2000). But see
Stewart E. Sterk, Estoppel in Property Law, 77 NEB. L. REV. 756, 776-79 (1998) (arguing
many courts find servitudes by estoppel cannot arise without express representations about
permanent use).
446. Guardianship of K.N., 73 N.E.3d 271, 275-76 (Mass. 2017); see also Estroff v.
Chatterjee, 660 S.E.2d 73, 79 (N.C. App. 2008) ("Harm to the third party is immaterial. . .").
447. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 275-76 (1986).
445.
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A more plausible alternative appeals to reliance by the child. When
a legal parent encourages her child to develop parent-like bonds with
another adult, she should know that ending this relationship later may
harm the child. She shaped the child's beliefs about the role that this
new adult would occupy in her life. The child has an interest in maintaining the quasi-parent relationship that her parent created, which
could justify creating irrevocable rights for the de facto parent. 4 4 8
Thinking about consent under an estoppel rubric reorients de facto
parent law in a morally appropriate fashion that fits the doctrine
nicely. The legal parent's subjective assent to caretaking and emotional bonding is necessary because only with her acquiescence can
another adult perform enter roles at all. A teacher who secretly performed parent-like caretaking would have no claim. Yet, the legal parent need not subjectively assent to a new legal parent. Why? Because
parental consent is not what justifies elevating a de facto parent to
legal status. The justification for treating consent as irrevocable and
creating a new legal parent is to protect a relationship essential to the
child's wellbeing. This brings us to the final argument.
C.

PresumingHarm from Termination of Parent-likeRelationships

The last argument re-centers discussion about de facto parenthood
around child welfare. Perhaps states treat parental consent as a transfer of rights because protecting quasi-parent relationships is necessary
to protect child welfare. This argument admits de facto parenthood
limits the legal parent's rights and responds that this limitation is justified because it is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.
One version of this argument centers on the best interests of the
child. Professor Solangel Maldonado, for example, argues that proving
the elements of the de facto parent test by clear and convincing evidence is sufficient to rebut the parental presumption. 4 4 9 The argument
for this conclusion is reminiscent of Steven's dissent in Troxel. The law
defers to parental authority because parents tend to make decisions
that promote child welfare. Parental rights are an evidentiary presumption. 45 0 The petitioner bears the burden of production, but "proof
of a substantial relationship between the third party and the child
overcomes the presumption that the parent was acting in the child's
best interests in denying visitation .... "451

448. Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Ky. 2010) (arguing waiver doctrine
must apply to custody agreements to prevent legal parent from causing harm by terminating
relationship she encouraged to develop).
449. Maldonado, supra note 109, at 895.
450. Id. at 894-96.
451. Id. at 894.

972

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:909

As I argued in Section II.C, this theory of parental authority barely
qualifies as a conception of parental rights. Regardless, this argument
makes the same mistake as the lower court in Troxel. Why does a parent's decision to end a parent-like relationship imply that she is not
acting in her child's best interest? The de facto parent test "protects
children's interests in maintaining those relationships with caregivers
that have been shown to significantly benefit them in the long-term." 45 2
From this perspective, a de facto parent "threshold" is not giving "special weight" to parents' judgment about visitation. 453 This is a bare dispute about what is good for a child, simply shifted to a different procedural moment. Reformers presume children's lives go better when they
sustain parent-like relationships, so they make parents prove the contrary. In Troxel, the trial court presumed children benefit from grandparent relationships, so it made Granville prove the contrary. Just as
the decision whether "an intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the parent to make," 45 4 So should the
judgment whether a parent-like relationship would be beneficial.
One might try to revive the argument by switching to a presumption of harm. Parental rights, like any constitutional right, may be limited by state action narrowly tailored to a compelling interest, such as
protecting children from physical or psychological harm. 455 The key
point here is de facto parenthood does not require the petitioner to
prove harm in their specific case. The test assumes that limiting children's relationships with de facto parents is harmful. 45 6 The commentary to the Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act, for example, argues the court may award visitation to a "consistent caretaker"
under a best interest test, "because severance of a bonded and dependent relationship between a child and a nonparent is presumptively
harmful to the child." 45 7 If severing quasi-parent relationships is generally harmful, and the petitioner proves she a quasi-parent, then the
petitioner has rebutted the presumption that the parent acts in the
child's best interests.
Some courts adopt this presumption of harm. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court argues the existence of "a significant preexisting relationship . . . would allow an inference, when evaluating a

child's best interests, that measurable harm would befall the child on
452. Id. at 895; see also Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 347, at 439, 462-63
(arguing interests of children in care justifies infringing parental liberty).
453. See, e.g., In Interest of H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Tex. 2018) (assuming the threshold standing requirement is sufficient to distinguish Troxel).
454. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
455. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
456. In re Care & Prot. of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918, 926 (Mass. 2006); A.H. v. M.P., 857
N.E.2d 1061, 1071-72 (Mass. 2006).
457. UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT § 4 cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMVfN 2018).
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the disruption of that relationship."4 5 8 In In re E.L.M. C., the Colorado
Court of Appeals wrote, "without precisely defining all attributes of a
psychological parent, we further conclude that emotional harm to a
young child is intrinsic in the termination or significant curtailment of
the child's relationship with a psychological parent under any definition of that term." 45 9 It reached this empirical conclusion despite three
pages surveying tests that defined a de facto parent variously as someone who fulfills a child's psychological need for an adult, who the child
recognizes as a parent because of "daily guidance and nurturance,"
who "performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the
legal parent," or who has "fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role . .. . "460
As In re E.L.C.M. illustrates, the harm argument rests on an overbroad generalization. Not all de facto parents have such deep psychological bonds with the child that denying court-ordered visitation will
harm the child. Whether, how often, and how much a child will be
harmed if denied visitation with a parent-like caregiver is an empirical
question. And the empirical data is scarce.
When the A.L.I. first adopted a de facto parent provision in The
Principlesof Family Law in 2001, Robin Wilson criticized the drafters
for acting without empirical evidence. 4 61 Not only did they lack evidence about the psychological benefits of ongoing visitation, but they
also ignored substantial evidence that ongoing visitation with male expartners posed a substantial risk of abuse. What evidence has been
marshalled since?
The UNCVA commentary cites no evidence for a presumption of
harm. Most articles adopt the following reasoning. 462 According to an
influential theory of child development called "attachment theory," a
child's bond with a primary attachment figure influences her sense of
security and cognitive development. 4 63 When this attachment is disrupted, children fare worse on many measures of well-being. Children
from attachments with the person who is a continuous presence attending to their material and emotional needs, regardless of biological

458. A.H., 857 N.E.2d at 1069-70.
459. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004).
460. Id. at 559-61. But see In re Reese, 227 P.3d 900, 904 (Colo. App. 2010) (rejecting the
per se harm rule adopted in E.L.M.C).
461. Robin Fretwell Wilson, TrustingMothers:A Critiqueof the American Law Institute's
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1118-35 (2010).
462. See, e.g., Jamie Bryant, My Two Dads (and Three Moms): Balancing a Child's
Interest and a Parent'sFundamentalRight When GrantingDe Facto ParentStatus, 50 FAM.
L.Q. 151, 156 n. 27 (2016); Laufer-Ukeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 347, at 430, 439;
Rebecca L. Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 13
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 632-35 (2012); Feinberg, supra note 244, at 110.
463. Elrod, supra note 406, at 249-50.

974

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:909

or legal relatedness. Consequently, scholars argue, states may presume a child will suffer harm if she loses a parent-like attachment.
These scholars often rely heavily on Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, who
long ago recommended legal recognition for psychological parents. 4 6 4
This argument rests on doubtful inferences. Most attachment research
studies how children form initial parental attachments or form new attachments after losing a parent. 4 65 Attachments form irrespective of gender, sex, or biology, which supports neutral rules for parentage presumptions, preconception agreements, or adoption. 4 6 6 When separated from
their parents, children develop attachments to new caretakers, which
supports rights for de facto custodians in cases of parental abandonment. 4 67 Attachment theory does not, however, suggest all parent-like
bonds are equivalent. 4 68 In particular, it offers little support for extending rights to stepparent or relative caregivers over the objection of an
existing parent who maintained a relationship with the child. Relying
on Goldstein, et. al, is particularly problematic here. They recommend
strong deference to custodial parents and oppose judicial visitation orders even in a divorce between established parents. 4 69 They propose
recognizing new psychological parents when a child is outside parental
care for sufficient time to weaken her residual ties to the existing parent and to develop new attachments with a foster parent.47 0
Is there direct evidence about the likelihood of harm? With regard
to co-residential relatives caregivers, legal scholars have little evidence their attachments are equivalent to primary parental attachments. The most extensive discussion comes from Professor Karen

464. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT SOLNIT, AND ANNA FREUD, THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 16, 20-21 (1996) (revised collection of books
published between 1973 and 1986). See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 462, at 156 n. 27; LauferUkeles & Blecher-Prigat, supra note 347, at 430; Scharf, supra note 462, at 634-36.
465. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 462, at 632 (acknowledging empirical evidence is limited to situation when child loses principal attachment); Nicole M. Onorato, The Right to Be
Heard: Incorporating the Needs and Interests of Children of Nonmarital Families into the
VisitationRights Dialogue, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvOC. 491, 495 (2005) (citing A.G.
Broberg, A Review of Interventionsin the Parent-ChildRelationshipInformed by Attachment
Theory, 434 ACTA PAEDIATRICA Supp. 37 (2000)).
466. Feinberg, supra note 244, at 110 (citing Elrod, supra note 406, at 249-50 (citing
studies of intentional lesbian co-parents)); Bryant, supra note 462, at 156 (citing H. RUDOLPH
SCHAFFER, MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT CHILDREN

62 (1990)) (discussing lesbian co-parents);

Jane Hare & Leslie Richards, Children Raised by Lesbian Couples: Does Context of Birth
Affect Fatherand PartnerInvolvement?, 42 FAM. REL. 249, 253-54 (1993).
467. GOLDSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 464, at 20-22, 104-07; In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 818,
822 (Colo. 2012).
468. Some scholars recognize this distinction but nevertheless argue that child welfare
depends on a network of secondary attachments that deserve recognition. Shelley A. Riggs,
Response to Troxel v. Granville, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 39, 43 (2003).
469. GOLDSTEIN, ET. AL., supra note 464, at 23-27.
470. Id. at 104-07.
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Czapinsky in an article advocating for grandparent visitation that predates Troxel. According to her literature review, children are more
likely to report their grandparent is an important person in their lives
if the grandparent is more involved, but a grandparent's level of involvement had no measurable effect on child wellbeing. 47 1 None of this
research studied children who lose relationships with co-residential
grandparents after the parent and child move out.
The data about cohabitant and stepparent relationships is no better. Many scholars rely on studies about the effect of divorce on disrupting established parental relationships. 47 2 Professor Cynthia Grant
Bowman has written the most empirically grounded article arguing for
cohabitant visitation rights. She admits the study of cohabitation "is
in its infancy" and existing research supports conflicting conclusions. 47 3 As a result, she relies on studies about married stepparents. 47 4
Even with regard to stepparents, the results are mixed and mostly irrelevant. Stepparents may have a positive or negative effect on child
wellbeing, depending on many variables: the age of the child, the gender of the stepparent, the role of the non-residential parent, and the
presence of step or half-siblings. 47 5 More important, nearly all of the
studies Bowman cites concern stepparent relationships in intact stepfamilies.47 6 She cites only two studies about stepparent relationships
after divorce. They show some children maintain meaningful relationships with former stepparents, but they do not study how these relationships affect child wellbeing, much less suggests ending them is

471. Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents,Parentsand Grandchildren:Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1329-30 (1994) (discussing ANDREW J.
CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN GRANDPARENT: A PLACE IN
THE FAMILY, A LIFE APART (1986); ARTHUR KORNHABER & KENNETH L. WOODWARD,
GRANDPARENTS/GRANDCHILDREN THE VITAL CONNECTION 55 (1981)); see also Laurence C.
Nolan, Beyond Troxel: The Pragmatic Challenges of Grandparent Visitation Continue, 50
DRAKE L. REV. 267, 289 (2002) (finding data limited to "courts' sentimental generalizations").
472. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking ParenthoodAs an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879,
909-11 (1984); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The ConstitutionalRight of Children
to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 390 (1994);
Onorato, supra note 464, at 494-97.
473. Bowman, supra note 135, at 130, 132 (citing Marion C. Willetts & Nick G. Maroules,
Parental Reports of Adolescent Well-Being: Does Marital Status Matter?, 43 J.
DIVORCE

&

REMARRIAGE 129, 133 (2005)).

474. Id. at 133.
475. Id. at 133-35. See also David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine, Learning from Social Sciences:
A Model for Reformation of the Laws Affecting Stepfamilies, 97 DICK. L. REV. 49, 65 (1992).
476. Bowman, supra note 135, at 136 (arguing law should maintain emotional and financial benefits provided by stepparents but citing studies about intact families, such as
Bridget Freisthler et al., It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times, 38 J.
DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 83, 98-99 (2003)); Sarah E.C. Malia, Balancing Family Members'
InterestsRegarding Stepparent Rights and Obligations, 54 FAM. REL. 298, 304 (2005)).
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harmful. 47 7 Any claim that children suffer trauma from ending stepparent relationships is speculative, at best.
No reliable evidence suggests ending parent-like relationships typically harms children who maintain their primary parental attachments. While some children undoubtedly form deep bonds with de
facto parents, a blanket rule that treats all de facto parents as equal
parents is an overinclusive means to prevent harm when more narrowly tailored rules are available. Under a weak de facto parent rule,
social parents can petition for visitation as a third party and rebut the
parental presumption by proving harm in their particular case.
Another alternative is to narrow de facto parenthood to situations
where research suggests harm is likely. Under the 2001 A.L.I. Principles, an alleged de facto parent must prove she performed at least as
much "caretaking" as the legal parent. 47 8 A primary caretaker test
might rest on more solid constitutional footing, because attachment
research suggests disrupting primary caretaker relationships is traumatic irrespective of biological or legal parentage. Of course, if the de
facto parent was the primary caretaker, it will also be relatively easy
for litigants to marshal evidence of harm specific to this child. 47 9 Moreover, those who conceive of de facto parenthood as a parentage test
should be wary of a primary caretaker rule that implies real parents
must fulfill traditional conceptions of motherhood, which risks penalizing parents who work outside the home. In A.H. v. M.P., for example,
the nonbiological mother entered a preconception agreement with the
biological mother, who regarded her as an equal parent, yet the court
concluded the nonbiological mother had no rights as a de facto parent
because she played a "breadwinner" role and spent too much time bailing out her failing company while her partner stayed home with the
child. 4 8 0 The court's protestations that its ruling "is not meant to disparage or discount the role of the breadwinner in providing for a child's
welfare" rings relatively hollow, when the legal test explicitly requires

477. Bowman, supra note 135, at 135-36 (citing Constance R. Ahrons, Family Ties After
Divorce: Long-Term Implications for Children, 46 FAM. PROCESS 53, 60-61 (2006); Maria
Schmeeckle et al., What Makes Someone Family? Adult Children's Perceptions of Current
and Former Stepparents, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 595, 597-98 (2006)). Another qualitative
study asked former stepchildren about their experiences following their parents' divorces
from their stepparents, finding close relationships were more often sustained if the child
"claimed" the stepparent as kin during the marriage. Marilyn Coleman, et. al, Stepchildren's
Views about Former Step-Relationships Following Stepfamily Dissolution, 77 J.
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 775, 778 (2015). They speculate that children may benefit from sustained relationships but reported no systematic data about child welfare. Id. at 786-88.
478. A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1070 (Mass. 2006).
479. E.g., Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d 297, 304-05, 307 (S.D. 2008) (de facto father proved
he provided effectively all of child' s care, which was sufficient to prove establish harm without expert and thus rebut presumption).
480. A.H., 857 N.E.2d at 1064-65, 1067, 1071-72.
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courts to evaluate whether the petitioner's relationship "rise [s] to that
of a parental relationship. "481
The empirical evidence does not support the claim that law must
recognize de facto parents as full legal parents to protect children from
harm. The test could be narrowed to improve its fit, but a strong de
facto parent rule is not well-tailored to prevent harm to children.
V.

CONCLUSION

Sometimes easy cases make bad law. 4 8 2 Same-sex couples with preconception agreements should have been easy cases. Instead, formal
parentage rules discriminated against same-sex couples, so courts
turned to de facto parenthood to avoid depriving these children of their
non-biological mothers. Under non-discriminatory parentage statutes
like the UPA (2017), these will be easy cases, as they always should
have been. These courts reached the just result, but the strong de facto
parenthood doctrines that they created should have little ongoing role
in parentage law.
Where de facto parenthood seems appropriate, as in preconception
agreements or abandonment cases, the doctrine overlaps other formal
rules. Sometimes the redundancy is harmless, but often ad hoc judicial
application of this functional standard will upset the balance between
parental rights and child welfare struck by existing rules. De facto
parenthood's distinctive contribution is to treat residential caregivers
as equal parents. As applied in most stepparent or relative caregiver
cases, de facto parenthood will often violate the constitutional rights
of the existing legal parent. The legal parent did not "consent" to create
a new parent by accepting caretaking assistance or encouraging her
new partner to form a relationship with her child, and there is no evidence children often suffer harm when their relationships with co-residential stepparents, cohabitants, or relatives end.
Someone must decide what goods, activities, and relationships will
benefit each particular child. Someone must make these judgments,
despite normative and empirical disagreements about what children
need to flourish. As a matter of constitutional law, we entrust parents
to decide what benefits their children. That includes the authority to
decide whether their child will benefit from an ongoing relationship
with a former "parent-like" caregiver.

481. Id. at 1071-72.
482. United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 381 (6th Cir. 2009) (Sutton, J., concurring)
("Sometimes hard cases make bad law. And sometimes easy cases make bad law. Only rarely,
however, do easy cases make bad law by overruling good law.").
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